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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two independent essays approaching two macroeconomic
problems: development outcomes and international risk sharing.
The first essay analyzes the relationship of income inequality and economic develop-
ment. I use a difference-in-differences specification with data from Brazilian munici-
palities to show empirical evidence that the origins of inequality matter to determine
development outcomes across different economies. Inequality in sugar-producing areas
in Brazil was historically associated with non-market allocation of resources, namely
slavery and royal land grants. In contrast, wheat-growing places were settled under
market-related mechanisms of free labor and auction acquisition of land. I add to the
Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis by showing that there is not a simple relationship of
inequality and development. Instead, I find that non-market inequality was harmful
compared to market inequality. There is a differential negative effect of inequality on
development in sugar compared to wheat areas. Schooling and public goods provision
seem to be two important channels for those different paths of development.
The second essay explores pairwise determinants of international risk sharing. The
low levels of income and consumption risk sharing found in empirical research are still
not well understood in the literature. I first estimate the amount of risk sharing and
find averages of zero for income and of 37% for consumption. Then I test potential
direct determinants and find that equity assets seem to be contributing to income
risk sharing. For consumption, international deposits seem to be helpful. Finally I
look for indirect determinants, among which WTO membership, common language,
migration and the share of companies listed in the stock market play a role for income
risk sharing. For consumption, the size of the economies, WTO and regional trade
agreements, geographic distance, migration, ease of doing business and a legal rights
index seem to be important.
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Chapter 1
Inequality and Development: The
Case of Brazilian Municipalities
1.1 Introduction
The role inequality plays in economic development has been extensively debated for
over 60 years and yet many questions remain unresolved. Researchers have explored
several different approaches and found contradictory results on the sign of the cor-
relation of inequality and development, the direction of causality, and if there is any
significant relation at all. Some argue that inequality is helpful by providing an effi-
cient allocation of resources and by giving the right incentives for people to work hard.
Others emphasize that it is harmful because it contributes to poorer institutions and
inefficient political choices.
In a series of papers, Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2005) propose that,
due to technological features, sugarcane crops were historically associated with larger
farms, the formation of a political oligarchy and intensive presence of slavery, whereas
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wheat crops favored family farms and a stronger middle class. These factors led sug-
arcane economies to have more inequality. According to their hypothesis, inequality
affects the quality of institutions, educational attainment and public goods provision,
being negatively related to development. As a corollary, economic development may
have been hindered in those economies.
However, I examine the case of Brazilian municipalities to show that there is not a
simple relationship of inequality and development. Rather, the influence of inequality
on development differs by crop. I find that the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis may be
not necessarily about sugarcane crops leading to more inequality and consequently
lower development levels. Instead, inequality in sugarcane places was originally asso-
ciated with harmful non-market mechanisms of allocation of resources.
I build the institutional argument based on the different settlement strategies
followed for wheat and sugarcane crops within Brazil, which led to differences in the
origins of inequality. During the colonial period, sugarcane farms were associated
with slavery and royal land grants, whereas wheat places were settled under a more
market-related framework, where the use of free immigrant labor and the auction
acquisition of land prevailed. These settlement schemes lasted for centuries shaping
the allocation of economic resources and the formation of the Brazilian society.
Therefore, the persistence of an inefficient distribution of wealth and income over
time tended to be more harmful in sugar areas, where the allocation of resources
followed non-market mechanisms. Societies with strong concentration of wealth and
income determined by inefficient non-market mechanisms have lower development
outcomes, i.e., sugar municipalities lose more from inequality. This is verified in the
descriptive data and in a variety of regressions.
I first show that there is not a clear relationship of inequality and development
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in OLS estimations with basic control variables. Then, by using a difference-in-
differences specification, I show that this relationship becomes significant and robust
when allowing it to differ by crop. The empirical results indicate that higher levels of
inequality in sugar places provide a differential harmful effect on output per capita
and poverty rate, when compared to higher levels of inequality in wheat places. An
increase of one standard deviation in the Gini index is associated with a differential
9.7% average decrease in income per capita and 8.9% average increase in poverty rate
in sugar municipalities with respect to wheat municipalities.
Finally I explore the channels that might explain why the effects of inequality on
development outcomes differ by crop. The evidence points to schooling and public
goods provision. Having these two as dependent variables, the results are consistent
with a harmful non-market inequality in sugar places. Having them as controls, when
income per capita is the dependent variable, makes the coefficients of the inequality-
sugar term insignificant, as the point estimates drop by half. When poverty rate is
the dependent variable, the point estimates drop to nearly zero.
Regarding the validity of the specification, it is possible, and even likely, that
inequality is endogenous to development levels. Moreover, as natural resources are
an input to the production function, it is also possible that agricultural endowments
affected income through other channels, and income affected institutional quality,
educational attainment, public goods provision, etc. This creates an identification
challenge for any empirical study testing the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis: how to
isolate these alternative channels.
The main contribution of this essay is to approach this identification challenge by
using a difference-in-differences specification with an interaction term of inequality
levels, as measured by the Gini index of income, and a dummy variable indicating
3
to which crop the municipality is more suitable. The suitability variables are based
purely on technical geographic factors to avoid endogeneity problems. The interac-
tion term allows for having the crop dummy alone, inequality alone, and also the
suitability measure itself as control variables. This will isolate any alternative chan-
nel for the relation of agricultural endowments and development levels, as long as it is
not simultaneously correlated with inequality. In particular, it will isolate a plausible
effect of reverse causality that output might have on inequality.
Yet I pay special attention to two alternative channels for the relation of agri-
cultural endowments and development levels that could possibly be simultaneously
correlated with inequality: i) the natural resource curse — high agricultural produc-
tivity in sugar economies purportedly created a comparative advantage in agricultural
instead of industrial activities, leading wheat, and not sugar economies, to industrial-
ization and high development levels; and ii) wheat as a more valuable endowment —
it might be the case that wheat became a more valuable endowment yielding wheat
places higher agricultural productivity and impacting several development outcomes.
I test and fail to confirm both alternative hypotheses. I show that, if existent, they
are not correlated with the interaction term of inequality and crop suitability.
Besides the finding that it is not simply the level, but the origins of inequality that
matter, this paper has other contrasts to the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis. I do not
argue that technological characteristics of agricultural endowments were determinant
for sugar places having more slavery. It might have been a mere correlation between
sugarcane and the use of slavery and land grants. Moreover, I do not need that sugar
areas were more unequal than wheat areas. Instead I document that their inequality
had different origins, which harmed development paths of sugar economies.
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1.2 Literature Review
A first wave of the growth literature proposed that inequality benefits development by
directing more income to high saving capitalists (Lewis, 1954; Kaldor, 1955, 1961). By
emphasizing the reward system of free markets, the argument can also be expressed
in different words, i.e., completely eliminating inequality would have obvious negative
effects on labor supply and savings; therefore inequality is positive for growth.
In contrast, a second wave of the literature argued that inequality could be harmful
to growth in many ways. From a political economy perspective, Alesina and Rodrik
(1994) asserted that “policies that maximize growth are optimal only for a government
that cares solely about pure capitalists. The greater the inequality of wealth and
income, the higher the rate of taxation, and the lower growth.” Other papers to
explore this line are Persson and Tabellini (1994)1 and Galor et al. (2009)2.
A second channel through which inequality may harm growth is through insti-
tutions. Acemoglu et al. (2011) refer to the emergence and persistence of inefficient
states based on patronage politics. “By choosing an inefficient state structure, the
rich elite may be able to use patronage and capture democratic politics, so reducing
the amount of redistribution in democracy. The inefficient state creates its own con-
stituency and tends to persist over time. Moreover, an inefficient state is more likely
to arise when there is greater income inequality.” Another reference in a similar line
is Banerjee and Iyer (2005).3
1Persson and Tabellini (1994) suggest that inequality is harmful for growth because “in a society
where distributional conflict is important, political decisions produce economic policies that tax
investment and growth-promoting activities in order to redistribute income.”
2Galor et al. (2009) suggests that “inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely
affected the emergence of human-capital promoting institutions (e.g., public schooling), and thus
the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing
to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries.”
3Banerjee and Iyer (2005) analyze “the colonial land revenue institutions set up by the British in
India, and show that differences in historical property rights institutions lead to sustained differences
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As inequality is associated with political instability, again it can harm institutions
and lower growth. Alesina et al. (1996) define political instability as the propensity
of a government collapse, and find that “in countries and time periods with a high
propensity of government collapse, growth is significantly lower than otherwise.”
A third channel is related to human capital. If there are imperfect capital markets
then inequality will limit human capital accumulation, which also links inequality
to underdevelopment (Galor and Zeira, 1993; Perotti, 1996; Galor and Moav, 2006;
Bourguignon and Verdier, 2000).4
Challenging these perspectives, Forbes (2000); Barro (2000); Banerjee and Du-
flo (2003) found a zero, nonlinear, or even positive relationship for inequality and
growth.5 6 The positive relationship of Forbes (2000) refers back to the thought of
beneficent inequality of Lewis (1954) and Kaldor (1955, 1961).
Criticism of this result was made on the grounds of poor quality of the data
(Deininger and Squire, 1996, 1998). Later, Deininger and Squire themselves were
questioned due to the fact that their inequality data were derived from several different
methodologies; individual vs. household surveys, income vs. expenditure data, and
in economic outcomes. Areas in which proprietary rights in land were historically given to landlords
have significantly lower agricultural investments and productivity in the post-independence period
than areas in which these rights were given to the cultivators. These areas also have significantly
lower investments in health and education.”
4Perotti (1996) investigates the relationship of income distribution, democratic institutions, and
growth. He concludes that “there is strong empirical support for two types of explanations, linking
income distribution to sociopolitical instability and to the education/fertility decision. A third
channel, based on the interplay of borrowing constraints and investment in human capital, also
seems to receive some support by the data, although it is probably the hardest to test with the
existing data.”
5Banerjee and Duflo (2003) show that “the growth rate is an inverted U-shaped function of net
changes in inequality: changes in inequality (in any direction) are associated with reduced growth
in the next period.”
6Barro (2000) uses “evidence from a broad panel of countries showing little overall relation
between income inequality and rates of growth and investment. For growth, higher inequality tends
to retard growth in poor countries and encourage growth in richer places. The Kuznets curve -
whereby inequality first increases and later decreases during the process of economic development -
emerges as a clear empirical regularity.”
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pretax vs. post-tax measures of income (Atkinson and Brandolini, 2001).
At the microeconomic level, Marrero and Rodriguez (2013) used household data
from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) to show that “one reason for
this ambiguity is that income inequality is actually a composite measure of inequal-
ity of opportunity and inequality of effort. They may affect growth through opposite
channels, thus the relationship between inequality and growth depends on which com-
ponent is larger.” They find empirical evidence of a negative relation for inequality
of opportunity and a positive one for inequality of effort.
1.2.1 The Engerman-Sokoloff Hypothesis: Agricultural En-
dowments as Determinants of Development Paths
Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2005) argue that factor endowments are a central
determinant of inequality and consequently bad institutions, low human capital in-
vestment and underdevelopment. Commodities featuring economies of scale and the
use of slave labor (sugarcane being the example of interest) were historically associ-
ated with high inequality. In contrast, other types of commodities (namely wheat)
allowed for family farms, attracted less slave labor and promoted the growth of the
middle class; thus they are often associated with more developed economies.
Easterly (2007) endorses Engerman and Sokoloff’s propositions arguing that the
correlation between inequality and growth is negative and the direction of causality
is from the former to the latter – inequality does cause underdevelopment.
Easterly’s approach refers to structural inequality as due to geographic and his-
torical factors, such as colonization, slavery and land distribution. This requires the
exclusion of the effect of inequality due to market channels, which comes from the
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fact that success in free markets is uneven across different individuals, firms, regions,
etc. With structural inequality isolated by the use of instrumental variables, the the-
oretical prediction is that this type of inequality has unambiguous negative effects on
growth, resulting in bad institutions, low human capital investment and underdevel-
opment.
Using data collected from the FAO, 2000, for 128 countries, Easterly shows ev-
idence that the ratio of land suitable for wheat to that for sugarcane is negatively
correlated with inequality. Therefore, the exogenous suitability of land for wheat ver-
sus sugarcane is used as an instrument for structural inequality. Using current income
per capita as a measure of development, he finds a negative and significant relation
between development and structural inequality. Moreover, he also finds similar results
using institutional quality and educational enrollment as measures of development.
More recently, Naritomi and Assuno (2012) used Brazilian historic data during the
sugarcane boom from the 1500’s until 1700’s and found that sugarcane was associated
with more land inequality today. Following the path of the slavery argument, they
found negative effects for gold economies on governance and access to justice. One
advantage of their approach is to use an interaction term between historical sugar
production and distance to Portugal.
Still regarding the Brazilian case, Musacchio et al. (2014) find some evidence that
the initial colonial institutions altered the trajectories of investments in education
in Brazilian states between 1889 and 1930. With US and cross-country data, Nunn
(2007) finds a positive association between slavery and land inequality.
However, explanations for the effect of agricultural endowments on development
outcomes are often subject to the criticism of alternative channels other than the
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inequality-institutional channel, e.g., the natural resource curse leading to compara-
tive advantages in non-industrial activities or the possibility that some endowments
(perhaps wheat) turned out to be more valuable than others (sugarcane) in the past
centuries. Moreover, the literature has been cautious with cross-country data due to
potential unobserved country heterogeneity, and because comparing inequality mea-
sures from different sources may be inappropriate.
Literature like Easterly (2007) makes use of instrument variables in an attempt to
focus on the effects of non-market inequality (or structural inequality, as the author
names it). This strategy is similar to the one in this paper in the sense that he also
allows for a possibly positive relation of market inequality and isolates it by using
agricultural endowments as instruments for inequality.
However, Easterly (2007) differs from this paper in the sense that, as a contribu-
tion to the literature, I use an interaction term to address the challenge of potential
alternative channels for the effects of agricultural endowments on development lev-
els. The identification strategy of this paper allows to gauge the differential effect of
inequality in sugar places compared to wheat places. The specification includes the
crop dummies and suitability indices as controls, which isolate the effects of alterna-
tive channels for the relation between crop suitability and development outcomes, as
long as they are not simultaneously correlated with inequality.
1.2.2 Methodology and Contrasts to the Engerman-Sokoloff
Hypothesis
I start by showing that the relation of inequality and development is insignificant in
the presence of regional fixed effects and some demographic controls. This suggests
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that country heterogeneity may be a problem to country-level approaches.
Then I make use of some historical facts. Sugarcane plantations were the leading
economic activity in Brazil in the period of 1530 - 1760, when the allocation of
resources followed primarily non-market mechanisms. Labor was based on slavery and
land was granted to families chosen by the Portuguese royalty. On the other hand,
wheat places made a stronger use of market mechanisms in the initial allocation
of resources. In those places, settlement became important after 1820, when slave
trade was declining and labor force was mainly provided by free immigrants. At that
time the royal land grants system was over (1822) and the Land Bill (1850 - 1964)
determined that land would have to be purchased from the government in auctions.
I show that the relation of inequality level and development becomes significant
and robust when allowing it to differ by crop. For that I use a dummy variable for
technical crop suitability at the municipality level to compare wheat and sugar loca-
tions, as indicators of places that made a more intense use of market vs. non-market
mechanisms in the initial allocation of resources. I test if inequality in sugar munici-
palities is associated with lower development levels compared to wheat municipalities.
Last I explore the channels that might explain why the effects of inequality on
development differ by crop. I use schooling and public goods provision as dependent
variables to show that their correlation with the inequality-crop interaction is consis-
tent with the theoretical prediction, even in the presence of a control for income per
capita. Then I use them as control variables to show that they seem to explain why
the inequality-crop term is associated with development levels.
Engerman-Sokoloff propose that sugarcane economies, as opposed to wheat places,
favored inequality, which was harmful to development outcomes. This is the most
evident contrast of this paper to their hypothesis. I find that the relation of inequality
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and current development levels is subtle and depends on the origins of inequality.
This paper does not necessarily rely on the assertion that sugar places are or
were more unequal, but it is the origins of their inequality that matter. Sugar, as
opposed to wheat, was historically associated with inequality originated during a
period of strong non-market allocation of labor and land resources. Then I test if this
association is correlated with harmful lingering effects on development outcomes of
present days.
Furthermore, this paper does not rely on the proposition that it is necessarily some
feature of wheat and sugar endowments that determined harmful choices of slavery
and land allocation. This may have been an occasional fact and what is important
here is the mere correlation between crop suitability and a harmful type of inequality.
Finally, this paper allows for an empirical way to reconcile the apparently contra-
dictory waves of the literature. The negative relation of non-market inequality and
development is not inconsistent with a possibly positive relation of market inequality
and development. It could be that both affect economic development simultaneously.
This framework shows that the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis appears to be some-
what simplistic, yet the essence is the same: slavery and royal land grants contributed
to the formation of a political and economic oligarchy, delivering inefficient institu-
tions and lower levels of human capital.
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1.3 Empirical Approach
1.3.1 Allocation of Resources in the Settlement of Brazil
The use of two inefficient non-market mechanisms in the allocation of labor and land
resources was a strong characteristic of sugarcane production. Brazilian colonization
took off with the sugar boom (1530-1760) based on a “plantation” system with three
core elements: “latifundio” (a large estate with a single owner), sugarcane mono-
culture and slave labor. For over 300 years the workforce in the sugar economy was
based on slavery. Slave trade was abolished only in 1850 and slavery officially ended
in 1888.
Since 1530 land use was determined by a designation system named “sesmarias.”
The Portuguese royalty granted the use of land to members of the Portuguese nobility
and their Brazilian nominees who where in charge of implementing the sugarcane
“plantations.” This system lasted until 1822 with the Brazilian independence.
Wheat production was not part of the Portuguese plans during the colonial period.
Wheat suitability is concentrated in the south, where intensive settlement took place
only in the mid 1800’s with free immigrants coming from other parts of the country
(1850-), Germany (1820-) and Italy (1870-). This made the workforce in the wheat
regions consisted mainly of free men.
The Land Bill (1850-1964)7 determined that unoccupied land would have to be
purchased from government in auctions. Those who already possessed land were
allowed to keep it, but new allocation would follow competitive processes. The timing
coincides with the settlement of the southern Brazilian territory such that the effects
of the Land Bill were more pronounced in the wheat regions.
7BRASIL, Lei n. 601, de 18 de setembro 1850.
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Both free labor and auction acquisition of land are market-related mechanisms in
the sense that supply and demand were freely determined by agents, as opposed to
supply and demand under slavery and royal land grants schemes. In contrast, the
institutional arrangement in the sugar economy shaped a certain initial allocation of
resources that diverged from efficiency. Slavery did not reward productivity or human
capital accumulation, and land was not acquired by the most productive farmers.8
Therefore, the persistence of an inefficient distribution of wealth and income over
time tended to be more harmful in sugar areas, where the allocation of resources
followed non-market mechanisms. Societies with strong concentration of wealth and
income determined by inefficient non-market mechanisms should have lower develop-
ment outcomes, i.e., sugar municipalities lose more from inequality.
This is precisely consistent with the data. Figure 1.1 depicts the relation of output
per capita and inequality separately for sugarcane and wheat places. For sugar,
the relation is significantly negative, meaning that higher levels of inequality are
associated with lower levels of output. The opposite holds for wheat places. Inferences
for the differences between those descriptive plots are presented throughout this paper.
1.3.2 The Dataset
In addition to the main contribution, there are some advantages of this paper over
cross-country studies. For each variable, all the data are provided by one unique
source. This prevents difficulties that commonly arise when comparing variables from
different statistical methodologies across countries. A rich collection of statistics is
provided by the Brazilian Agency for Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro
de Geografia e Estatistica – IBGE), established in 1936 for the purpose of carrying
8For further references on Brazilian economic history, see Simonsen (2005).
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out most official population and economic statistics, including the census surveys and
the GDP releases.
By focusing on Brazil alone I eliminate issues with unobserved country heterogene-
ity. Instead, to control for within country heterogeneity, I use regional fixed effects
and other municipality-level controls. This provides a stronger argument against
the possibility that important variables may have been omitted, such as language,
religion, the origin of the legal system, etc.
Brazil is very large, with nearly 5,570 municipalities, having both tropical regions
appropriate for sugarcane crops, and non-tropical regions suitable to wheat crops.
It is the number one producer of sugarcane in the world and is ranked among the
top 20 producers of wheat. It presents extreme regional variations in development
levels as income per capita can be as much as four times higher in the richer southern
compared to the poorer northern states. Using data of nearly 5,570 cross-sectional
observations gives a great variability and high power tests.
The dataset on agricultural suitability comes from the FAO Global Agro-Ecological
Zones (GAEZ), which provides an index on the technical potential for cultivation of
wheat and sugarcane based on water-balance, soil moisture conditions, radiation and
temperature. Actual production is not considered to avoid endogeneity problems. The
index is presented in two forms: a value number (a continuous variable increasing in
suitability) and classes (1 indicating high suitability and 8 indicating not suitable, 9
is water). Figure 3 illustrates the dataset.
The FAO GAEZ provides the information in the form of georeferenced grid cells.
I use a Geographic Information System (GIS) to assign to each municipality aver-
age indices (for both class and value indices) based on an average weighted by the
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approximate area of the municipality covered by each grid cell.9
I build two dummy variables indicating the predominance in crop suitability using
the class index. Since the class index of a municipality is calculated as an average of
its grid cells, then it becomes a continuous variable. Whenever the difference between
the classes of wheat and sugar is greater than one, either the “Wheat Dummy” or the
“Sugar Dummy” is assigned. If the difference between the classes is less than one,
then the “Similar Dummy” is assigned. “Similar” is omitted from the regressions
due to colinearity, except when interacted with another variable.
Information on GDP, population, inequality, institutions, etc. refers to 2010 (or
the most approximate year available) and is provided by the Brazilian Agency for
Geography and Statistics (IBGE). The public goods and schooling datasets are pro-
vided by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in contribution with
the IBGE. Data on municipal governmental budget come from the National Treasury
Secretariat.
1.3.3 Regression Specification
I consider municipal output per capita and poverty rate as measures of current de-
velopment levels. For municipality i in region j the basic specification is as follows:
Yij = β0 + β1Inequality * Sugar Dummy ij + β2Inequality ij+
+ β3Sugar Dummy ij + β4Wheat Dummy ij+
β5Sugar Suitability ij + β6Wheat Suitability ij +XijΓ + Sj + ij (1.1)
9The median municipality contains five grid cells and the mean is 18.
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where Xij is a vector of control variables and Sj is regional or state fixed effects.
Inequality is measured as the Gini Index in 2010. The coefficient of interest β1
gauges how development level responds to changes in inequality differently in wheat
and sugar places. If the theoretical prediction is correct, β1 should be negative,
meaning that increases in inequality in sugar places, compared to wheat places, are
associated with smaller gains or larger losses in development levels.
Because the dummy variables indicate three groups of municipalities, one must
be omitted. For the interaction terms I choose to omit the wheat group because that
facilitates the interpretation. The t-test of the coefficient β1 on the interaction term
“Inequality * Sugar Dummy” gives the differential effect of inequality in places with
sugar as opposed to wheat predominance.
Having inequality on the right-hand side allows to control for candidate explana-
tions for the relation with development outcomes, as long as not correlated with the
crop dummies. In particular, it allows to control for a likely effect of reverse causal-
ity of development on inequality. Similarly, the crop dummies will capture effects of
agricultural endowments on development, as long as not correlated with inequality.
The suitability indices, from which the dummies are derived, are additional controls
aiming at the direct endowment-output relationship.
A requirement of this empirical approach is that current levels of inequality in
sugar places reflect past non-market allocation of resources, possibly through slavery,
royal land grants or both. Naritomi and Assuno (2012) present evidence in this line
for Brazil. Therefore the predominance of sugar suitability over wheat suitability
interacted with current inequality levels becomes a proxy for the intensity of the use
of those non-market mechanisms.
The lingering effects of historical non-market inequality on output per capita,
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poverty rate and other outcomes is the main proposition of Engerman-Sokoloff, and
it is the object of the empirical tests in this paper. Leaving aside the two alternative
channels for which I run explicit tests, the underlying assumption of the specification
is that, without slavery and land grants, the second derivative of the outcome variables
with respect to the crop dummy and inequality would have been the same in wheat
and sugar places. As a counter-factual argument, it cannot be shown directly. But I
show that, controlling for schooling and public goods provision, that second derivative
of output and poverty rate with respect to the crop dummy and inequality is indeed
statistically the same in wheat and sugar places.
1.4 The Outcomes of the Wheat-Sugar Indicator
Table 1.2 shows the overall relation of wheat and sugar endowments and output
per capita. It follows typical cross-country evidence that sugarcane economies are
usually poorer than wheat economies. However, this relation becomes statistically
insignificant when regional fixed effects and other control variables such as population
and latitude are introduced. Table 1.3 provides similar results for poverty rate as the
dependent variable.
Interestingly it is possible that having higher suitability is beneficial to output
per capita and poverty rate for both crops. The theoretical prediction is that the
harmful effects of those endowments come from the switch from wheat to sugar, and
not from the endowments themselves. This reflects the idea that both wheat and
sugar, as natural resources, serve as inputs to the production function, reassuring
the importance of isolating this effect from the coefficient of interest in the main
specification.
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Table 1.4 points to the same direction as Table 1.2, when regressing output per
capita on inequality. The apparently negative relation fades away when regional fixed
effects and other control variables are added. This finding illustrates the ambiguous
results for the effects of inequality on development established in the literature, which
is the motivation for the empirical strategy of this paper.
Table 1.5 shows the results with poverty rate as the outcome variable. As one
should expect, as inequality increases and income is more concentrated, the per-
centage of population below poverty line also increases. This does not come as sur-
prise, since inequality and poverty rate are related by construction, regardless the
Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis.
1.4.1 The Effect of Farm Size and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
on Inequality
Table 1.6 shows that there is a positive differential effect of farm size on inequality
in sugar places compared to wheat places. This is inspired by the first part of the
proposition of the Engermann-Sokoloff hypothesis, but their hypothesis implies that
wheat and sugar endowments have a lingering effect on inequality and institutions,
not necessarily on farm size.
I find that the effect of the interaction of current farm size and sugar crops is signif-
icantly greater than that of wheat crops. This can be interpreted as the combination
of sugar and larger farms giving those municipalities a higher level of inequality. This
is consistent with the setup of Engerman-Sokoloff, but it does not imply that sugar
places are more unequal. As column (5) shows, they might be less unequal, given
the set of controls. What is important here is that larger farms in sugar places are
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associated with more inequality, when compared to wheat places. Thus the sign of
the coefficient of the interaction term satisfies the theoretical proposition as it pro-
vides evidence that there is some additional effect in the combination of farm size
and sugar places. This is aligned with the findings of Naritomi and Assuno (2012)
that sugarcane colonial heritage had an effect on current land inequality.
1.4.2 The Effect of Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
on Development Outcomes
The results of the main estimating equation are reported next. Table 1.7 shows
that inequality in sugar places has a negative differential effect compared to wheat
places. Controlling for the dummy variables wheat and similar (the wheat dummy
is omitted due to collinearity) ensures that it is not the switch from sugar to wheat
itself that makes output levels higher. It is the combination of high inequality in
sugar places that provides lower levels of output per capita. The results are robust to
the introduction of measures of crop suitability, latitude, demographic variables and
regional fixed effects.
The magnitude of the effects is meaningful. Considering the average estimated
coefficient of the four reported regressions, an increase of one standard deviation in
the Gini index is associated with a differential 9.7% decrease in income per capita in
sugar municipalities with respect to wheat municipalities.10
The hypotheses of an agricultural endowment curse working against sugar munic-
ipalities or of wheat as a more valuable endowment, if not correlated with inequality,
10Income per capita is measured in logs such that the estimated coefficient measures the percentage
change in income.
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would be reflected on the coefficient of the sugar dummy or possibly on the coeffi-
cients of the suitability indices. This is irrelevant to the Engerman-Sokoloff hypoth-
esis. What is important is that those effects are not biasing the coefficient on the
interaction term.
Table 1.8 reports similar results for poverty rate as the outcome variable. Highly
unequal sugar places have higher levels of poverty rate when compared to wheat
places. The average estimate suggests that for an increase of one standard devia-
tion in the Gini index there is a differential 8.9% increase in poverty rate in sugar
municipalities with respect to wheat municipalities.11
1.5 Potential Channels for the Effects of Inequal-
ity and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
The literature defending that inequality is harmful to development refers to several
potential channels, among which education attainment and public goods provision
are often cited. It is argued that, under imperfect capital markets, inequality limits
human capital accumulation12. Inefficient states arise13 and investments in public
goods and infrastructure are more limited14 where state is governed by a rich elite.
Using these potential channels as dependent variables, I test if the inequality-crop
interaction term is a plausible determinant for them, with signs and significance
levels consistent with the theoretical prediction that inequality lowers schooling and
public goods provision.
11Poverty rate is measured in percentage terms and the estimate of 8.9% refers to an increase of
2.1 percentage points to an average rate of 23%.
12Galor and Zeira (1993); Perotti (1996); Galor and Moav (2006); Bourguignon and Verdier (2000).
13Banerjee and Iyer (2005); Acemoglu et al. (2011).
14Engerman and Sokoloff (1997, 2000, 2005).
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1.5.1 Schooling
I test average years of schooling as a potential channel for the effect of wheat and
sugar endowments, as indicators of market and non-market allocation of resources on
development levels. Table 1.9 shows that high inequality in sugar places seems to be
associated with lower schooling levels, compared to wheat places. This is robust to
the introduction of the same control variables as before.
Table 1.10 shows that this effect is still significant when controlling for output per
capita, suggesting that the association between high inequality in sugar places and
low schooling is stronger than what could be solely an indirect effect through output
level. This is a strong argument in favor of the Engerman-Sokoloff hypothesis acting
through education attainment.
1.5.2 Public Goods
Tables 11 and 12 report similar tests for another potential channel: public goods
provision — an index built on access to water, sanitation, illumination and garbage
collection. Again, highly unequal sugar places seem to provide lower levels of public
goods, even when controlling for output. This is evidence that for public goods,
too, the association with inequality in sugar places is not completely explained by
higher levels of output. This is a strong argument in favor of the Engerman-Sokoloff
hypothesis acting through public goods provision as well.
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1.5.3 Municipal Budget as a Potential Explanation for School-
ing and Public Goods Provision
Table 1.13 tests if municipal budgets could explain the lower levels of schooling and
public goods provision for highly unequal sugar municipalities. I find that these
municipalities do not have lower total budgetary allowances as a fraction of output,
as the coefficients are positive but insignificant. This result fails to provide support
to the hypothesis that those places have lower levels of schooling and public goods
because of a choice of smaller governments.
Table 1.14 sheds light on one of the municipal budget items: payments to corpo-
rations for the provision of services as a fraction of total budget (20% of municipal
expenses on average). These payments combine three features that increase the po-
tential for fraud and corruption: a) they are the largest budget item after payroll;
b) being provided by corporations makes it easier for large-scale corruption; c) the
delivery of services is more difficult than goods to be checked by monitoring authori-
ties. The evidence indicates that highly unequal sugar places tend to spend a larger
fraction of their budget on expenses that are more susceptible to fraud and corruption.
1.5.4 The Effect of Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
on Development Outcomes Controlling for Potential
Channels
Theory predicts that human capital and institutional quality were two important
channels through which non-market inequality affected economic development. Tables
15 and 16 test these channels. They show that the effects of inequality interacted with
crop endowment previously found seem to fade away when controlling for schooling
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and public goods provision. They become mostly insignificant for both output per
capita and poverty rate. The point estimates drop by half for output per capita and
to nearly zero for poverty rate.
As previously discussed, Tables 10 and 12 showed that income does not explain
higher levels of schooling and public goods provision in highly unequal sugar places.
Tables 15 and 16 show that the converse holds. Schooling and public goods provision
do explain higher levels of output per capita and lower levels of poverty rate in highly
unequal sugar places. This is consistent with the proposition that human capital
and institutional quality were two important channels through which non-market
inequality affected economic development.
1.6 Alternative Hypotheses for the Effects of Wheat-
Sugar Endowments
Next I test alternative hypotheses for the relations of inequality, crop suitability
and development levels. The natural resource curse proposes that high agricultural
productivity in sugar economies purportedly created a comparative advantage in agri-
cultural instead of industrial activities, leading wheat, and not sugar economies, to
industrialization and higher development levels.
As long as agricultural productivity is not simultaneously correlated with inequal-
ity, this hypothesis is not a problem to the main specification, since there are control
dummies for crop suitability that would capture that effect. However, if correlated
with inequality, then the alternative hypothesis could be biasing the coefficient of
interest. For this reason, I explicitly test if highly unequal sugar economies are more
agricultural then wheat economies.
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Table 1.17 shows no evidence in favor of this hypothesis. The dependent variable
is the fraction of the value added by the agricultural sector. The results do not show
any significant coefficients for the interaction term, i.e., the natural resource curse, if
existent, is not correlated with the inequality-sugar term.
Another hypothesis is that wheat, supposedly a more valuable endowment, made
some economies richer through higher agricultural productivity, and this might be
correlated with less inequality. Again, this is not a problem to the main specification,
unless if simultaneously correlated with inequality. So I test if agricultural activity in
highly unequal sugar municipalities is more productive than in wheat municipalities.
Table 1.18 has as dependent variable agricultural productivity, defined as total
value of agricultural production divided by the area harvested. Results show that
the coefficients are highly insignificant for the interaction of sugar and inequality on
agricultural productivity, suggesting that this effect, if existent, is not driving the
results for the coefficient of interest.
1.7 Conclusion
This chapter approaches the relation of agricultural endowments, inequality and de-
velopment to propose a new interpretation of Brazil’s experience. In contrast to
Engerman-Sokoloff, I do not assert that sugar economies turned out to be more un-
equal or that inequality is necessarily harmful. Neither I argue that sugar activities
favored slavery, nor that sugar places became poorer than wheat places. Instead, I
propose that it is not just the level, but most importantly the origins of inequality
that matter. And it is not about the agricultural endowments themselves, it is about
the manner of settlement.
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During the colonial period, sugarcane municipalities in Brazil were associated
with malefic non-market mechanisms of allocation of resources, e.g., slavery and royal
land grants; whereas wheat places were settled later, under free labor and auction
acquisition of land. These non-market mechanisms led sugar economies to have a
type of inequality that was harmful to development.
The main contribution is to apply a difference-in-differences specification with
an interaction term that separates the effects of inequality in municipalities with
a history of strong use of non-market mechanisms from those with a strong use of
market-related mechanisms of allocation of resources. This allows to isolate a po-
tential effect of reverse causality and also any alternative channel for the relation of
agricultural endowments and development levels that is not simultaneously correlated
with inequality. Moreover, the choice of dataset avoids capturing unobserved hetero-
geneity across countries and prevents problems with the use of inequality measures
from different methodologies.
I find that highly unequal sugar places have a differential harmful effect on out-
put per capita and poverty rate, when compared to wheat places. The results are
robust to a variety of control variables, including regional fixed effects, latitude and
demographics. On average, an increase of one standard deviation in the Gini Index is
associated with a differential decrease of 9.7% in income per capita and an increase
of 8.9% in poverty rate in sugar municipalities with respect to wheat municipalities.
Lower levels of schooling and public goods provision are also associated with highly
unequal sugar places, with evidence that this association is not explained by output
levels, suggesting that schooling and public goods are not merely a consequence of
higher income. The choice of smaller municipal budgets, if existent, does not seem to
be associated with lower levels of schooling and public goods provision through the
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sugar-inequality interaction term, whereas fraud and corruption might be a starting
point for future research.
I find no evidence of two alternative hypotheses. One, that the results are driven
by a possible agricultural endowment curse that affected sugar economies. Two, that
the results are driven by the supposed fact that wheat turned out to be a more
valuable endowment.
Finally, the point estimates of the effect of sugar inequality on output per capita
become insignificant and drop by half on average, when I introduce controls for school-
ing and public goods. For poverty rate, the point estimates drop by 90% on average.
This suggests that schooling and public goods are two important channels for the
effect of non-market inequality on economic outcomes.
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Figure 1.1: Output per Capita Regressed on Gini Index by Crop
(a) Sugarcane
GDPpci = 4.00− 3.61Ginii + i
SE (0.09) (0.17)
Obs.: 3,348
(b) Wheat
GDPpci = 1.97 + 1.31Ginii + i
SE (0.32) (0.66)
Obs.: 195
Figure 1.2: Brazilian Municipalities – Territorial Density of Population and GDP
(a) Population (residents/km2) (b) GDP (US$/km2)
Note: population is as in 2010 census release. GDP is as in 2011 release at current prices
converted to US$ with IMF purchase power parity implied exchange rate (1.80 BRL/US$).
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Figure 1.3: Sugarcane and Wheat Suitability
(a) Sugarcane (b) Wheat
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) — Global Agro-
ecological Zones (GAEZ).
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Table 1.1: Summary Statistics
GDP pc Poverty Gini Schooling Public Goods
(BRL) Rate (%) Index (years) Index
Wheat Dummy
Average 15795 13.02 48.3 9.69 0.354
Median 13078 11.04 47.7 9.71 0.390
Std. Error 11744 8.88 5.7 0.86 0.252
Obs.: 195
Sugar Dummy
Average 11546 28.36 51.6 9.30 -0.183
Median 7542 30.66 51.8 9.30 0.032
Std. Error 13986 18.80 6.8 1.13 0.859
Obs.: 3348
Similar Suitability
Average 14605 15.64 48.4 9.70 0.271
Median 12100 11.05 48.3 9.71 0.461
Std. Error 15070 13.38 6.0 1.01 0.565
Obs.: 2019
Notes: the sugar and wheat dummies indicate to which crop the municipality is more suitable.
Similar indicates that wheat and sugar suitability indices fall within the range of the same class.
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Table 1.2: Output per Capita Regressed on the Wheat-Sugar Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sugar Dummy -0.320** -0.246** -0.052 0.016 -0.015
(0.125) (0.097) (0.058) (0.055) (0.047)
Wheat Dummy 0.142 0.197* 0.058 0.007 -0.009
(0.100) (0.109) (0.069) (0.047) (0.033)
Sugar Suitability 1.113** 0.883*** 0.357* 0.326*
(0.439) (0.257) (0.184) (0.166)
Wheat Suitability 1.932*** -0.198 -0.400 -0.495**
(0.513) (0.315) (0.275) (0.192)
Population 0.037*** 0.049***
(0.013) (0.013)
Urban Population 0.671*** 0.566***
(0.130) (0.100)
Latitude -0.043*** -0.047***
(0.01) (0.01)
Constant 2.459 1.925 2.415 1.005 0.987
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.33) (0.27)
Regional FE No No Yes Yes No
State FE No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.056 0.262 0.476 0.557 0.608
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 3.3 23.7 57.6 199.2 .
P-Value of the test
β1 − β2 = 0 0.026 0.008 0.317 0.910 0.917
Notes: dependent variable is output per capita. The sugar and wheat dummies indicate to which
crop the municipality is more suitable. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous
variables increasing in suitability. Population is in logs and urban population is in percent terms.
Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered
at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.3: Poverty Rate Regressed on the Wheat-Sugar Indicator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Sugar Dummy 0.127*** 0.091*** 0.024 0.011 0.013
(0.034) (0.026) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009)
Wheat Dummy -0.026 -0.032 -0.000 0.008 0.014
(0.020) (0.029) (0.013) (0.012) (0.014)
Sugar Suitability -0.282** -0.194*** -0.049 -0.065
(0.113) (0.056) (0.036) (0.039)
Wheat Suitability -0.657*** -0.008 0.054 0.081*
(0.135) (0.054) (0.051) (0.046)
Population 0.005 0.001
(0.003) (0.004)
Urban Population -0.289*** -0.259***
(0.030) (0.028)
Latitude 0.010*** 0.013**
(0.00) (0.01)
Constant 0.156 0.319 0.171 0.461 0.701
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.06) (0.08)
Regional FE No No Yes Yes No
State FE No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.126 0.413 0.683 0.804 0.834
Obs. 5560 5560 5560 5560 5560
F-stat of the Model 7.0 22.2 161.1 184.8 .
P-Value of the test
β1 − β2 = 0 0.002 0.010 0.281 0.827 0.928
Notes: dependent variable is poverty rate. The sugar and wheat dummies indicate to which
crop the municipality is more suitable. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous
variables increasing in suitability. Population is in logs and urban population is in percent terms.
Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis
and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.4: Output per Capita Regressed on Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini -3.333*** -0.421 -0.271 -0.132
(0.599) (0.251) (0.216) (0.143)
Population 0.041*** 0.049***
(0.015) (0.013)
Urban Population 0.695*** 0.594***
(0.152) (0.117)
Latitude -0.044*** -0.041**
(0.012) (0.015)
Constant 3.948 2.852 1.173 1.253
(0.310) (0.164) (0.317) (0.281)
Regional FE No Yes Yes No
State FE No No No Yes
R-squared 0.101 0.454 0.552 0.605
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 31.0 44.5 76.8 .
Notes: dependent variable is output per capita. Population is in logs and
urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.5: Poverty Rate Regressed on Inequality
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Gini 1.584*** 0.740*** 0.679*** 0.614***
(0.149) (0.073) (0.055) (0.046)
Population -0.009** -0.011**
(0.003) (0.005)
Urban Population -0.243*** -0.226***
(0.030) (0.028)
Latitude 0.010*** 0.012**
(0.002) (0.005)
Constant -0.565 -0.244 0.196 0.395
(0.065) (0.037) (0.059) (0.070)
Regional FE No Yes Yes No
State FE No No No Yes
R-squared 0.343 0.719 0.842 0.862
Obs. 5560 5560 5560 5560
F-stat of the Model 113.7 133.7 369.9 .
Notes: dependent variable is poverty rate. Population is in logs and urban
population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects.
Standard errors are displayed in parenthesis and clustered at the state level.
∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.6: Inequality Regressed on Farm Size and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Farm Size * Sug. Dummy 0.592*** 0.604*** 0.761*** 0.898***
(0.106) (0.104) (0.157) (0.163)
Farm Size * Sim. Dummy 0.522*** 0.543*** 0.727*** 0.856***
(0.099) (0.100) (0.156) (0.161)
Farm Size -0.565*** -0.581*** -0.787*** -0.916***
(0.100) (0.103) (0.152) (0.157)
Sugar Dummy -0.041*** -0.041** -0.039*** -0.054*** -0.025**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.011)
Similar Dummy -0.029*** -0.034*** -0.034*** -0.047*** -0.019**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.008) (0.010) (0.009)
Sugar Suitability 0.090 0.050 0.064 0.065
(0.057) (0.055) (0.061) (0.060)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.190** -0.117 -0.136* -0.138*
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Wheat Suitability -0.035 -0.019 -0.040 -0.037
(0.08) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 0.014 -0.026 0.030 0.026
(0.21) (0.16) (0.12) (0.13)
Constant 0.55 0.54 0.42 0.52 0.49
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.288 0.303 0.400 0.442 0.434
Obs. 5536 5536 5536 5536 5562
F-stat of the Model 37.9 117.8 58.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is the Gini Index. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is
higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class
for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing
in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and urban population
is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.7: Output per Capita Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -1.998* -1.685* -0.990 -1.102**
(1.040) (0.898) (0.593) (0.510)
Gini * Similar Dummy -1.242* -1.157 -0.670 -0.869*
(0.719) (0.707) (0.474) (0.487)
Gini 1.304* 1.206* 0.625 0.847**
(0.692) (0.669) (0.429) (0.393)
Sugar Dummy 1.162* 0.686 0.483 0.493** -0.038
(0.568) (0.454) (0.295) (0.229) (0.068)
Similar Dummy 0.673* 0.481 0.320 0.399 -0.019
(0.368) (0.353) (0.240) (0.234) (0.043)
Sugar Suitability 1.086* 0.372 0.648 0.624
(0.544) (0.343) (0.399) (0.393)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.321 -0.076 -0.459 -0.418
(0.81) (0.50) (0.47) (0.47)
Wheat Suitability -0.109 -0.933 -0.264 -0.268
(0.73) (0.61) (0.45) (0.44)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. -0.371 1.499 -0.755 -0.696
(1.70) (1.83) (1.46) (1.43)
Constant 1.84 1.89 0.69 0.59 0.99
(0.41) (0.42) (0.47) (0.40) (0.26)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.461 0.478 0.558 0.609 0.609
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 60.8 90.7 143.9 . .
Notes: dependent variable is output per capita. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is
higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class
for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing
in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and urban population
is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.8: Poverty Rate Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy 0.499** 0.431** 0.181** 0.108
(0.205) (0.187) (0.085) (0.071)
Gini * Similar Dummy 0.157 0.152 -0.021 -0.007
(0.147) (0.146) (0.046) (0.052)
Gini 0.375** 0.387*** 0.580*** 0.551***
(0.135) (0.137) (0.043) (0.041)
Sugar Dummy -0.271** -0.183** -0.089** -0.054 -0.016
(0.098) (0.083) (0.039) (0.032) (0.020)
Similar Dummy -0.096 -0.070 -0.003 -0.010 -0.025
(0.069) (0.066) (0.022) (0.026) (0.015)
Sugar Suitability -0.140 0.064 0.024 0.072
(0.099) (0.053) (0.062) (0.083)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.040 -0.129 -0.107 -0.205**
(0.13) (0.08) (0.07) (0.10)
Wheat Suitability -0.024 0.173 0.081 0.054
(0.14) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 0.148 -0.269 0.049 0.064
(0.29) (0.28) (0.24) (0.31)
Constant -0.04 -0.05 0.24 0.45 0.72
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.723 0.733 0.845 0.864 0.835
Obs. 5560 5560 5560 5560 5560
F-stat of the Model 269.7 1182.4 849.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is poverty rate. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is higher
for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class for
wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing
in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and urban population
is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.9: Average Years of Schooling Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -5.867*** -5.206*** -3.967*** -2.644***
(1.018) (0.842) (0.673) (0.753)
Gini * Similar Dummy -2.166*** -2.239*** -1.391* -1.340
(0.626) (0.573) (0.707) (0.930)
Gini 1.106** 0.964** 0.545 0.432
(0.440) (0.428) (0.417) (0.640)
Sugar Dummy 3.479*** 3.322*** 2.658*** 1.665*** 0.418**
(0.493) (0.384) (0.343) (0.366) (0.159)
Similar Dummy 1.414*** 1.587*** 1.147*** 1.038** 0.422**
(0.246) (0.255) (0.373) (0.434) (0.153)
Sugar Suitability -1.385** -1.590** -0.530 -0.729*
(0.616) (0.582) (0.339) (0.360)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. 1.944** 2.076** 0.715 1.090**
(0.81) (0.79) (0.45) (0.47)
Wheat Suitability 0.216 0.236 -0.181 -0.098
(1.10) (0.84) (0.86) (0.91)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 2.794 2.515 -0.388 -0.310
(4.01) (3.06) (2.18) (2.25)
Constant 8.47 8.55 8.88 7.94 8.10
(0.26) (0.29) (0.64) (0.22) (0.32)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.330 0.339 0.366 0.512 0.506
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 234.1 230.8 1591.1 . .
Notes: dependent variable is expected number of years of schooling. The sugar dummy indicates
that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same
suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous
variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and
urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.10: Average Years of Schooling Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction Controlling for Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -5.306*** -4.729*** -3.733*** -2.537***
(0.772) (0.692) (0.629) (0.725)
Gini * Similar Dummy -1.817*** -1.911*** -1.233* -1.256
(0.582) (0.477) (0.669) (0.882)
Gini 0.740** 0.622* 0.398 0.350
(0.350) (0.340) (0.444) (0.634)
Sugar Dummy 3.153*** 3.127*** 2.544*** 1.617*** 0.422**
(0.359) (0.345) (0.337) (0.359) (0.160)
Similar Dummy 1.225*** 1.451*** 1.072*** 0.999** 0.424**
(0.266) (0.243) (0.365) (0.416) (0.155)
Sugar Suitability -1.693** -1.678*** -0.592* -0.793**
(0.610) (0.601) (0.339) (0.360)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. 2.035** 2.094** 0.760 1.132**
(0.78) (0.80) (0.45) (0.47)
Wheat Suitability 0.247 0.456 -0.156 -0.071
(1.03) (0.84) (0.87) (0.92)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 2.899 2.162 -0.315 -0.240
(3.69) (2.82) (2.08) (2.14)
GDP pc 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.24*** 0.10** 0.10**
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 7.95 8.02 8.72 7.88 8.00
(0.31) (0.33) (0.60) (0.22) (0.29)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.347 0.356 0.376 0.514 0.508
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 403.8 454.6 724.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is expected number of years of schooling. The sugar dummy indicates
that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same
suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous
variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and
urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.11: Public Goods Index Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -3.508*** -3.373*** -1.931** -0.868*
(1.004) (1.008) (0.695) (0.470)
Gini * Similar Dummy -1.162* -0.992 0.011 -0.025
(0.672) (0.633) (0.301) (0.257)
Gini -0.184 -0.289 -1.082*** -1.069***
(0.359) (0.424) (0.210) (0.204)
Sugar Dummy 1.796*** 1.282** 0.690* 0.261 -0.124*
(0.473) (0.479) (0.339) (0.245) (0.070)
Similar Dummy 0.605* 0.280 -0.143 -0.078 -0.060
(0.324) (0.304) (0.127) (0.141) (0.041)
Sugar Suitability 2.069*** 1.237** 0.634** 0.469*
(0.678) (0.486) (0.239) (0.267)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -1.605* -1.323** -0.470* -0.152
(0.79) (0.60) (0.25) (0.27)
Wheat Suitability -0.008 -0.887* -0.060 0.030
(0.55) (0.46) (0.31) (0.35)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. -1.475 0.421 -0.987 -1.006
(1.36) (1.22) (0.88) (1.02)
Constant 0.43 0.45 -0.58 -1.62 -2.16
(0.19) (0.24) (0.28) (0.27) (0.29)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.497 0.517 0.638 0.713 0.703
Obs. 5557 5557 5557 5557 5557
F-stat of the Model 19.4 139.7 173.9 . .
Notes: dependent variable is a public goods index, calculated as the fraction of population with
access to: public illumination, piped water, piped water and bathrooms and garbage collection.
The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the
similar dummy indicates the same suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and
Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared
variables. Population is in logs and urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and
State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.12: Public Goods Index Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction Controlling for Output
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -2.702*** -2.733*** -1.721** -0.677
(0.734) (0.771) (0.658) (0.428)
Gini * Similar Dummy -0.659 -0.550 0.153 0.125
(0.471) (0.443) (0.273) (0.224)
Gini -0.712*** -0.749*** -1.215*** -1.215***
(0.189) (0.259) (0.221) (0.203)
Sugar Dummy 1.327*** 1.021*** 0.588* 0.176 -0.118*
(0.336) (0.366) (0.322) (0.223) (0.068)
Similar Dummy 0.332 0.096 -0.211* -0.147 -0.056
(0.214) (0.204) (0.108) (0.121) (0.040)
Sugar Suitability 1.654*** 1.159** 0.522** 0.359
(0.565) (0.479) (0.245) (0.265)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -1.482** -1.307** -0.390 -0.078
(0.68) (0.60) (0.27) (0.26)
Wheat Suitability 0.034 -0.689* -0.015 0.077
(0.39) (0.40) (0.30) (0.34)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. -1.336 0.104 -0.857 -0.884
(1.23) (1.14) (0.77) (0.90)
GDP pc 0.40*** 0.38*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.18***
(0.07) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant -0.32 -0.28 -0.72 -1.72 -2.34
(0.17) (0.19) (0.26) (0.22) (0.25)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.567 0.577 0.654 0.723 0.712
Obs. 5557 5557 5557 5557 5557
F-stat of the Model 35.8 307.0 210.2 . .
Notes: dependent variable is a public goods index, calculated as the fraction of population with
access to: public illumination, piped water, piped water and bathrooms and garbage collection.
The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the
similar dummy indicates the same suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and
Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared
variables. Population is in logs and urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and
State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state
level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.13: Municipal Budget Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy 1.098 0.452 0.968 0.886
(1.453) (1.344) (0.773) (0.767)
Gini -2.104* -1.830 0.012 -0.038
(1.104) (1.143) (0.483) (0.513)
Gini * Similar Dummy 0.953 0.703 0.970** 1.126**
(1.057) (0.964) (0.453) (0.508)
Sugar Dummy -0.809 0.235 -0.265 -0.310 0.096
(0.759) (0.675) (0.394) (0.406) (0.096)
Similar Dummy -0.577 -0.072 -0.359 -0.468 0.059
(0.552) (0.483) (0.262) (0.294) (0.076)
Sugar Suitability -3.275*** -1.367** -1.279** -1.241**
(0.742) (0.592) (0.559) (0.570)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. 2.269** 0.813 0.697 0.605
(1.03) (0.81) (0.68) (0.72)
Wheat Suitability -1.008 0.026 -0.332 -0.332
(1.22) (0.85) (0.67) (0.66)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 2.561 0.793 1.724 1.679
(2.42) (2.32) (2.04) (2.06)
Constant 2.88 2.86 6.65 6.87 6.86
(0.61) (0.67) (0.66) (0.88) (0.77)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.294 0.331 0.556 0.596 0.594
Obs. 5492 5492 5492 5492 5492
F-stat of the Model 35.9 71.8 103.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is total municipal budget as a fraction of GDP. The sugar dummy
indicates that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates
the same suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are
continuous variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in
logs and urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects.
Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p <
0.01.
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Table 1.14: Municipal Payments to Corporations for the Provision of Services
Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy 0.096* 0.105** 0.061 0.083**
(0.051) (0.043) (0.039) (0.034)
Gini * Similar Dummy 0.041 0.036 0.009 0.018
(0.033) (0.044) (0.056) (0.048)
Gini 0.028 0.031 -0.024 -0.041
(0.041) (0.036) (0.033) (0.032)
Sugar Dummy -0.028 -0.049* -0.012 -0.030 0.010
(0.028) (0.026) (0.024) (0.021) (0.008)
Similar Dummy -0.008 -0.015 0.008 0.002 0.010
(0.020) (0.029) (0.033) (0.028) (0.007)
Sugar Suitability 0.057 -0.017 -0.046 -0.040
(0.058) (0.040) (0.031) (0.030)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.004 0.039 0.059 0.049
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Wheat Suitability 0.079 0.012 0.038 0.035
(0.07) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. -0.252* -0.104 -0.181 -0.183*
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.11)
Constant 0.10 0.09 -0.08 -0.07 -0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.084 0.092 0.182 0.235 0.235
Obs. 5492 5492 5492 5492 5492
F-stat of the Model 11.7 10.2 49.2 . .
Notes: dependent variable is municipal payments to corporations for the provision of services,
as a fraction of total budget. These payments combine three features that increase the potential
for fraud and corruption: a) they are the largest budget item after payroll; b) being provided by
corporations makes it easier for large-scale corruption; c) the delivery of services is more difficult
than goods to be checked by monitoring authorities. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability
is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class
for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing
in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population is in logs and urban population
is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in
parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.15: Output per Capita Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction Controlling for Schooling and Public Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -0.655 -0.465 -0.478 -0.927*
(0.661) (0.594) (0.550) (0.471)
Gini 1.329** 1.264** 0.803* 1.040**
(0.573) (0.552) (0.437) (0.397)
Gini * Similar Dummy -0.793 -0.777 -0.617 -0.855*
(0.515) (0.519) (0.447) (0.455)
Sugar Dummy 0.460 0.178 0.251 0.434** -0.019
(0.374) (0.305) (0.273) (0.209) (0.068)
Similar Dummy 0.430 0.343 0.301 0.406* -0.011
(0.260) (0.260) (0.225) (0.213) (0.044)
Schooling 0.032 0.033 0.040** 0.007 0.007
(0.024) (0.020) (0.017) (0.012) (0.012)
Public Goods 0.328*** 0.309*** 0.185*** 0.183*** 0.180***
(0.06) (0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Constant 1.427 1.473 0.444 0.823 1.319
(0.52) (0.49) (0.52) (0.40) (0.25)
Crop Suitability No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.536 0.544 0.579 0.621 0.621
Obs. 5557 5557 5557 5557 5557
F-stat of the Model 177.9 141.3 104.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is output per capita. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is
higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class
for wheat and sugar. Crop Suitability refers to a quadratic function of wheat and sugar suitability.
Schooling is in years. Public Goods is the index previously described. Population is in logs and
urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.16: Poverty Rate Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
Controlling for Schooling and Public Goods
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy 0.042 0.004 -0.011 0.010
(0.097) (0.089) (0.053) (0.046)
Gini * Similar Dummy 0.005 0.019 -0.040 -0.026
(0.077) (0.076) (0.032) (0.030)
Gini 0.371*** 0.371*** 0.513*** 0.480***
(0.092) (0.091) (0.043) (0.037)
Sugar Dummy -0.030 -0.002 -0.003 -0.013 -0.020
(0.044) (0.035) (0.023) (0.017) (0.017)
Similar Dummy -0.013 -0.020 0.004 -0.002 -0.023*
(0.035) (0.032) (0.013) (0.014) (0.012)
Schooling -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.014*** -0.013*** -0.015***
(0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Public Goods -0.105*** -0.104*** -0.069*** -0.071*** -0.081***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Constant 0.124 0.112 0.328 0.433 0.664
(0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08)
Crop Suitability No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.848 0.851 0.889 0.900 0.883
Obs. 5555 5555 5555 5555 5555
F-stat of the Model 432.1 864.8 1000.8 . .
Notes: dependent variable is poverty rate. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is higher
for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class for
wheat and sugar. Crop Suitability refers to a quadratic function of wheat and sugar suitability.
Schooling is in years. Public Goods is the index previously described. Population is in logs and
urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard
errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.17: Fraction of the Value Added by the Agricultural Sector Regressed on
Inequality and Wheat-Sugar Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy 0.080 0.026 -0.034 -0.090
(0.329) (0.322) (0.208) (0.125)
Gini * Similar Dummy 0.070 0.094 0.039 0.115
(0.237) (0.236) (0.122) (0.114)
Gini -0.101 -0.102 0.213 0.156
(0.288) (0.294) (0.166) (0.137)
Sugar Dummy -0.049 -0.045 -0.030 0.002 -0.046
(0.171) (0.175) (0.108) (0.070) (0.029)
Similar Dummy -0.048 -0.076 -0.061 -0.088 -0.035
(0.135) (0.138) (0.071) (0.071) (0.029)
Sugar Suitability 0.175 0.445*** 0.325** 0.319**
(0.134) (0.130) (0.125) (0.131)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.249 -0.485*** -0.286* -0.281
(0.19) (0.17) (0.16) (0.17)
Wheat Suitability -0.148 -0.073 -0.149* -0.144*
(0.21) (0.10) (0.07) (0.08)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 0.049 0.018 0.189 0.191
(0.49) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19)
Constant 0.41 0.41 0.84 0.77 0.85
(0.16) (0.16) (0.10) (0.05) (0.07)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.157 0.162 0.448 0.542 0.538
Obs. 5562 5562 5562 5562 5562
F-stat of the Model 14.6 123.2 226.5 . .
Notes: dependent variable is the fraction of the value added by the agricultural sector. The sugar
dummy indicates that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat, whereas the similar dummy
indicates the same suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar Suitability and Wheat Suitability
are continuous variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands for squared variables. Population
is in logs and urban population is in percent terms. Regional FE and State FE indicate fixed
effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p <
0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Table 1.18: Agricultural Productivity Regressed on Inequality and Wheat-Sugar
Interaction
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Gini * Sugar Dummy -2.305 -0.620 0.259 -1.096
(2.922) (2.843) (2.358) (2.331)
Gini * Similar Dummy -0.605 -0.015 0.621 0.344
(3.327) (3.250) (2.903) (2.761)
Gini -1.517 -2.279 -3.030 -1.992
(3.449) (3.317) (3.147) (3.148)
Sugar Dummy 1.346 -0.274 -0.643 0.079 -0.397
(1.483) (1.403) (1.221) (1.258) (0.303)
Similar Dummy 0.193 -0.380 -0.646 -0.375 -0.160
(1.715) (1.705) (1.572) (1.500) (0.287)
Sugar Suitability 2.124** 1.360 1.596** 1.322
(0.984) (0.845) (0.757) (0.819)
Sugar Suitability Sqd. -0.027 0.432 -0.343 0.176
(1.42) (1.29) (0.97) (1.13)
Wheat Suitability -3.598* -4.116** -4.665** -4.505**
(1.83) (1.88) (1.69) (1.69)
Wheat Suitability Sqd. 10.214* 11.086** 10.230** 10.166**
(5.52) (5.35) (4.70) (4.63)
Constant 2.33 2.85 1.84 2.35 1.33
(1.73) (1.66) (1.78) (2.09) (0.72)
Regional FE Yes Yes Yes No No
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Latitude No No Yes Yes Yes
Population No No Yes Yes Yes
Urban Pop. No No Yes Yes Yes
R-squared 0.066 0.076 0.085 0.106 0.104
Obs. 5501 5501 5501 5501 5501
F-stat of the Model 23.1 719.4 573.2 . .
Notes: dependent variable is agricultural productivity, as total production value divided by
harvested area. The sugar dummy indicates that suitability is higher for sugar than for wheat,
whereas the similar dummy indicates the same suitability class for wheat and sugar. Sugar
Suitability and Wheat Suitability are continuous variables increasing in suitability. Sqd. stands
for squared variables. Population is in logs and urban population is in percent terms. Regional
FE and State FE indicate fixed effects. Standard errors are in parenthesis and clustered at the
state level. ∗p < 0.10, ∗ ∗ p < 0.05, ∗ ∗ ∗p < 0.01.
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Chapter 2
Pairwise Determinants of Risk
Sharing
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2.1 Introduction
In the absence of frictions, theory predicts that a country will trade securities with
others until it achieves full risk sharing. This implies that idiosyncratic output fluctu-
ations would be pooled, making income and consumption growth less volatile. How-
ever, there is a vast economic literature showing the empirical disconnection of con-
sumption and income growth from full insurance and the causes of that have been
under investigation. Using a pairwise approach, this chapter provides empirical evi-
dence of the determinants of international risk sharing.1
The motivation is to shed light on an important macroeconomic problem. Liter-
ature points to large potential welfare gains in international risk sharing. Obstfeld
and Rogoff (2001) describe the low levels of risk sharing among “The Six Major
Puzzles in International Macroeconomics.” Hence understanding the factors driving
international risk sharing is a relevant effort to the literature.
I approach the problem by testing direct and indirect factors that are candidate
determinants of risk sharing. Identifying those that do help and the ones that fail to
help seems to be a starting point for clarifying the puzzle. The main contribution is
that I use bilateral relations, first to estimate risk sharing levels of pairs of countries,
then to look for their determinants. For instance, instead of seeking the determinants
of risk sharing between the U.S. and the rest of the world, I seek the determinants
of risk sharing between the U.S. and Germany, Canada and France, etc. The risk
sharing estimate of a pair of countries may vary with characteristics of that pair,
like distance and language, that are not captured in country-world approach. Indeed
countries trade securities with partner countries, not with the world as an entity,
1Throughout this chapter, I use the terms risk sharing, insurance and smoothing interchangeably.
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which makes this a more realistic assessment.2
Output is considered to be exogenous and subject to stochastic shocks. Under a
stylized Arrow-Debreu model, markets are complete and countries can pool risk by
signing contingent contracts with each other at no cost, compensating any idiosyn-
cratic output shocks. The implication is that each country should have the same
income and consumption growth rates as the whole world and country-specific out-
put shocks would not affect welfare. If that is true for all countries, then it should be
true for each pair of countries.
The first step is to estimate the amount of insurance for all pairs of countries. I
adapt the approaches of Obstfeld (1994b) and Sørensen and Yosha (1998) to build
specifications to estimate pairwise coefficients for income and consumption risk shar-
ing. The empirical results show nearly zero levels of income smoothing, which is
consistent with other literature that points to low degrees of insurance, specially for
income. For consumption, I find significant positive estimates, which indicate that
countries share risk mostly through borrowing and lending as opposed to diversifying
income sources.3
The second step is to look for the pairwise determinants. I test direct and indirect
candidate determinants of income and consumption risk sharing. The direct deter-
minants are closely related to macroeconomic identities. Using the IMF SNA 2008
standard,4 income from foreign direct investment, portfolio equity and compensation
2Canova and Ravn (1996) use a pairwise approach with a different setting under the null hypoth-
esis of full insurance. They “find that aggregate domestic consumption is almost completely insured
against idiosyncratic real, demographic, fiscal and monetary shocks over short cycles, but that it
covaries with these variables over medium and long cycles.”
3Sørensen and Yosha (1998) find no international income insurance among OECD countries,
whereas about 40% of shocks to GDP are smoothed by budget deficits and corporate savings.
Volosovych (2013) estimates the mean estimate of income risk sharing to be 1.94%. Kose et al.
(2009) find a modest degree of international consumption risk sharing.
4International Monetary Fund System of National Accounts, 2008.
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of employees are the three most important factors that distinguish domestic product
from national income. Because FDI flows should be determinant to FDI income,
FDI flows are used as an explanatory variable to income risk sharing. Similarly, I
use portfolio equity investment and migration as direct determinants of income from
portfolio equity and compensation of employees. I find that holding portfolio equity
assets is positively and significantly correlated with income risk sharing. FDI flows
do not have the expected sign and migration is insignificant.
For the direct determinants of consumption risk sharing, the variables of interest
must be directly associated with international borrowing and lending. Thus interna-
tional assets and liabilities are used as explanatory variables. The empirical results
show that deposits and multilateral loans are positive determinants. Bank loans, IMF
loans and reserves have a negative sign.
The indirect determinants are factors that are commonly cited in the economic
literature as important to the direct determinants, e.g., having a common language
and being part of the World Trade Organization (WTO) may be important for two
countries to share risks through foreign direct investment or through borrowing and
lending. The same set of regressors is used as indirect determinants for both income
and consumption. For income, I find that countries tend to smooth fluctuations when
they are members of the WTO, share a common language, have strong migration and
a large share of companies in the stock market. For consumption, the size of their
economy, WTO and regional trade agreements, geographic distance, migration, ease
of doing business and strength of legal rights seem to help.
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2.2 Theory and Literature
Considering a standard risk averse agent, a smooth consumption flow is preferred to
a volatile one. Output fluctuations may lead to undesirable volatility of income and
consumption. Hence agents will prefer to smooth output shocks possibly through
income or consumption means. By sharing risks with each other they can achieve
smoother income and consumption paths rendering them welfare gains.
Based on classic models of complete contingent claims markets proposed by Ar-
row and Debreu (1954), Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996) provide a textbook model of
consumption risk sharing. By trading securities, a country’s choice of consumption in
different states of the world becomes similar to the choice of consumption in different
periods of time. As a corollary of the model, the marginal rates of substitution must
be equalized, hence all countries should have the same consumption growth rate.
However the degree of risk sharing found in the data does not match the model
predictions. Backus et al. (1992) find that international output growth rates are more
highly correlated than consumption growth rates. Lewis (1996) investigated the rea-
sons why empirical consumption correlations are not as predicted. She allowed utility
not to be separable in tradables and nontradables and also allowed for incomplete
markets. She found evidence that a combination of those two factors together may
explain a low degree of consumption risk sharing.5 6
5Other empirical studies have been more successful in finding significant risk sharing levels at the
intranational level. Asdrubali et al. (1996) “decompose the cross-sectional variance in gross state
product into several components which they refer to as levels of smoothing. They find that 39 percent
of shocks to gross state product are smoothed by capital markets, 13 percent are smoothed by the
federal government, and 23 percent are smoothed by credit markets. The remaining 25 percent are
not smoothed.”
6Crucini (1999) compared the provinces of Canada, the states of the United States, and the G-7
countries, and found similar degrees of risk sharing within regions of Canada and the U.S. that
exceed the risk sharing that occurs across countries.
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One potential explanation for this macroeconomic puzzle is the existence of fric-
tions when trading international securities. Nonetheless, several papers have sug-
gested relatively large potential welfare gains from risk sharing.7 8 The general con-
clusion is that the welfare benefits more than compensate the costs. This reinforces
the question why the empirical evidence points to such low levels of insurance.
Becker and Hoffmann (2006) investigate empirically how industrialized countries
and U.S. states share consumption risk. U.S. federal states share about 50 percent
of their permanent idiosyncratic risk through cross-state capital income flows. While
insurance against transitory fluctuations in output is virtually complete, OECD coun-
tries do not share any of their permanent idiosyncratic risk. Transaction costs cannot
explain the home bias, since the potential welfare gains from insurance would by far
outweigh that of insuring against transitory variation. They conclude that market
incompleteness may be preventing insurance of permanent shocks, in particular at
the international level.
Asdrubali and Kim (2008) model incomplete risk sharing as well as incomplete
intertemporal smoothing, distinguishing between the effects of temporary vs. perma-
nent shocks. They find negligible international risk sharing and show that “industrial
countries have tended to absorb output shocks mostly through intertemporal smooth-
ing. About 25% of all temporary shocks are smoothed this way, while a comparable
fraction of permanent shocks determine consumption growth.”
Sørensen and Yosha (1998) sought risk sharing patterns among European Comu-
nity and OCDE countries and found that factor income flows do not play an important
role in smoothing income across countries. Around 40 percent of the consumption
7For example: Wincoop (1994), Wincoop (1996), Lewis (1996), Shiller and Athanasoulis (1995),
Obstfeld (1994a) and Obstfeld (1996).
8Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) provide an expression to measure the welfare gains.
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smoothing comes from savings, this being the most important channel.
Wincoop (1999) attempts to explain the deviation from risk sharing by question-
ing to what extent the results are sensitive to the parameterization of preferences,
and assumptions about the stochastic process and measurement of the endowment.
He finds that the welfare gains are quite sizable for realistic assumptions about the
underlying factors.
Kalemli-Ozcan et al. (2001) provide a closed form expression for the gains from risk
sharing for CRRA utility. The more a country can gain from sharing country specific
risk with other countries in a group, the more asymmetric are its GDP fluctuations
relative to the group. Balli and Balli (2011) applied this model to Pacific island
countries and found that, under full risk sharing, overall welfare gains are at desirable
levels.
Sørensen et al. (2007) relate the home bias and the risk sharing puzzles show-
ing that “international home bias in bond and equity holdings declined during the
late 1990s at the same time as international risk sharing increased. Also, countries
with less home bias, on average, tended to obtain more risk sharing in international
markets. Using panel data estimations, we demonstrate that less home bias is asso-
ciated with more international risk sharing when both cross-sectional and time-series
dimensions are taken into account.”
Kose et al. (2009) extend the analysis to a larger group of developing countries,
allowing for changes over time in the degree of risk sharing and different measures of
risk sharing. They find that there is a modest degree of risk sharing for industrial
countries, possibly fostered by finacial globalization, whereas for developing economies
they find no evidence of improved risk sharing. They also conclude that portfolio debt,
more important to emerging economies, is not conducive to risk sharing.
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Volosovych (2013) searches for factors that explain cross-country differences in the
extent of risk sharing restricting attention to one of the channels: asset diversification
and income flows. He finds little evidence of risk sharing, mostly related to investor
protection.
Kalemli-Ozcan and Sørensen (2008) group the barriers to financial integration as:
a) transaction costs, i.e., higher costs associated with international assets trade; b)
lower information transparency for foreign investors, given that investors will gener-
ally know better the assets in the home country; c) moral hazard and sovereign risks,
referring to the limits to enforcement of international contracts; and d) currency risk,
which will step in if purchase power parity fails to hold.
Fratzscher and Imbs (2009) use a bilateral approach with interaction terms that al-
low for differential risk sharing measures depending on financial openness and quality
of institutions. These are interpreted as two substitute determinants of risk shar-
ing. In this paper I also take advantage of the bilateral approach and add other
determinants, like language, migration, WTO membership, geographic distance, etc.
2.3 Empirical Strategy
I use a two-step identification strategy. First I estimate the pairwise level of risk
sharing with the regression equation:
g˜dpijt − g˜niijt = αIij + βIij g˜dpijt + ijt, (2.1)
where g˜dpijt = ∆ ln gdpit − ∆ ln gdpjt is the output growth differential between the
pair of countries i and j. Similarly, g˜niijt is the national income growth differential
for i and j.
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With perfect income risk sharing, all countries should have the same income
growth and the left-hand side of Eq. 1 should equal g˜dpijt, thus β
I
ij would be one.
In the complete absence of risk sharing, the left-hand side of Eq. 1 is uncorrelated
with g˜dpijt, such that the estimated coefficient should be zero. Thus β
I
ij can be
interpreted as a measure of income risk sharing between countries i and j.
For consumption risk sharing, I have:
g˜niijt − c˜ijt = αCij + βCij g˜niijt + ωijt, (2.2)
and c˜ijt is the consumption growth differential between the pair of countries i and j.
The same reasoning applies to the consumption risk sharing measure represented by
βCij in Eq. 2.
The second step is to look for direct and indirect determinants of income and
consumption risk sharing. For direct determinants of income risk sharing, I use the
definition of the IMF-SNA 2008 that GNIit = GDPit + Primary Incomeit. Some
of the most important components of primary income are direct investment income,
portfolio equity income and compensation of employees. For the first two I have data
on two straightforward determinants: foreign direct investment and investments in
portfolio equity. For compensation of employees I use migration as an approximate
direct determinant.
The identification is given by the following equation:
βˆIij = γ0 + γ1FDIij + γ2Portfolio Equity ij + γ3Migrationij + νij. (2.3)
βˆIij is not time-varying. I have a cross sectional measure of income risk sharing over
the period of 1978 - 2013. So for the regressors, too, I need a measure of overall
performance during that period. Then I use average measures spanning the same
period as much as the dataset is available.
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If not through income, a country can still share risks through international bor-
rowing and lending. This will reflect on the measure of consumption risk sharing.
Thus I use amounts of international assets and liabilities as direct determinants of
the flows of borrowing and lending. The estimating equation is:
βˆCij = θ0 + θ1BIS Depositsij + θ2BIS Loansij + θ3IMF Loansij
+ θ4Multilateral Loansij + θ5Reservesij + θ6SDRij + θ6Securitiesij + ιij, (2.4)
where BIS deposits and loans refer to operations with the Bank for International
Settlements reporting banks and SDR are the Special Drawing Rights on the IMF.
Again I use average measures spanning the period of 1978-2013 as much as the dataset
is available.
Finally I look for indirect determinants of risk sharing. The same regressors are
potential determinants of both income and consumption risk sharing. I borrow from
Bekaert and Wang (2009) several of them.9 The estimating equation is:
βˆI,Cij = φ0 + φ1GDP i x GDP j + φ2GDP Difference ij + φ3WTOij
+ φ4RTAij + φ5Common Language ij + φ6Geographic Distance ij
+ φ7Migration ij + φ8Ease-of-Business ij + φ9Credit Infoij+
φ10Legal Rights ij + φ11Listed Companies ij + τij. (2.5)
For convenience I suppress the indicators I and C on the φ coefficients and the
τij error term. The term “GDPi x GDPj” is the product of the logs of output for
countries i and j. It is commonly used in trade models that include trade volume
that increases with output and trade costs that increase with distance. Thus I use
it together with geographic distance as potential determinants of international asset
trading, i.e., primary income and borrowing and lending instruments.
9In Bekaert and Wang (2009) they are looking for the determinants of home bias.
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The term “GDP Difference” is the log of the difference of output between the
two countries in the pair. A negative (positive) sign could be reflecting that countries
choose to share more risks with partners that are similar (different) with respect to
the size of the economy.
The presence of WTO and regional trade agreements memberships as regressors
may have different theoretical explanations. For instance, a positive sign could be
reflecting that trade and foreign direct investments are complements at the firm level.
Or it could be reflecting that trade helps foreign portfolio investments due to an
improved informational environment that partner countries have of each other.
The effect of migration can also have different potential explanations. For in-
stance, it may have an impact on compensation of employees, one of the components
of primary income sent and received from abroad. This would relate migration to
income risk sharing. Or it may be related to consumption risk sharing if it helps the
information available to agents for the purpose of borrowing and lending abroad.
Ease-of-Business, Credit Info, Legal Rights and Listed Companies are indices pro-
vided by the World Bank. They relate to transaction costs and risks as determinants
of foreign investment. Further references on these topics can be found in Domowitz
et al. (2001) and Ahearne et al. (2004).
2.4 Dataset
For most of the variables I get the data from the World Bank Development Indicators
between 1978 and 2013 for 41 of the the world’s largest economies. They are not
available as bilateral relations. Thus for FDI, portfolio equity, migration and others, I
build the pairwise measures as the sum of the individual measures of the two countries
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in each pair. They are measured as fractions of GDP (share of population in the case
of migration).
The ease-of-business index ranks economies from 1 to 189. A high ranking (a
low numerical rank) means that the regulatory environment is conducive to business
operation. I take them with a negative sign to make the variable increasing in quality.
The credit info index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of
credit information. The index ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating the
availability of more credit information. Legal Rights Index measures the degree to
which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the rights of borrowers and lenders and
thus facilitate lending. The share of listed companies refers to the market value of
domestic companies incorporated on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the
year. These indices are provided by the World Bank Development Indicators.
I get data from the Joint External Debt Hub on deposits and loans with the
Bank for International Settlements reporting banks, loans with the IMF and other
multilateral institutions, international reserves, SDR allocation and international debt
securities.
Pairwise data on WTO and regional trade agreements memberships, common
language and geographic distance come from the gravity dataset available in Head
et al. (2010). WTO assumes the value of 2, 1 or 0, if both, one or none of the countries
in the pair is a World Trade Organization (or used to be a GATT) member. Regional
Trade Agreement is a dummy variable indicating a regional trade agreement in force
for the pair of countries. Common language is a dummy variable indicating pairs
of countries that share one official language. Geographic distance is the distance
between the two countries of a pair, weighted by their major cities.
The complete lists with all the variables, their appropriate names and descriptions
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are available in the appendices.
2.5 Empirical Results
2.5.1 Estimates of Income Risk Sharing
I have 820 estimates for income risk sharing βIij in Eq. 1, which correspond to the
bilateral relations amongst 41 countries. The summary statistics are reported in
Table 2.1 and the distribution is illustrated in Figure 2.1. The median is −0.010,
meaning that the median pair of countries shares no risk through income. This is
consistent with nearly zero levels of international income smoothing found in other
empirical literature. Each β̂Iij has its own standard deviation and confidence interval,
and statistics on the lower and upper bounds are reported in Table 2.1 as well. Both
the lower and upper bounds have their mean values farther from zero compared to
their median values. Figure 2.1 shows that the their distributions are skewed to the
left and right, respectively. This indicates that the coefficients β̂Iij that are farther
from zero tend to have larger variances, i.e., estimates around zero tend to be more
precise.
For each country i, I calculate the mean values of the coefficients β̂Iij over all j
countries. Table 2.2 reports these β̂Ii means. The country with the largest income
risk sharing estimate is Switzerland, whereas Argentina has the smallest.
Table 2.3 shows the ten pairs of countries with largest and the ten with smallest
estimates of income risk sharing. The pair of countries with the largest estimate
is Austria-Switzerland, with an estimated coefficient of .839, which implies roughly
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83.9% of income risk sharing. The interpretation is that their income is highly corre-
lated for a relatively small correlation of output. Among the low levels of risk sharing,
Egypt-Turkey and Singapore-Sweden have the smallest estimates. They are negative,
meaning that their income growth rates diverge more than their their output growth
rates.
Table 2.4 shows the top 10 and low 10 estimates considering countries pairing
with the U.S. only. Switzerland is the country that shares the most income risk with
the US, for a given output growth covariance. Sweden is the one with the smallest
estimate. The negative sign means that Sweden and the U.S. are actually increasing
risk by having income growth rates that diverge more than their output growth rates.
2.5.2 Estimates of Consumption Risk Sharing
The consumption risk sharing estimates are economically more interesting. Table
2.5 shows that countries do have significantly positive levels of consumption risk
sharing. The median observation is .371, meaning that they share about 37.1% of
consumption risk through international borrowing and lending. Given their income
growth fluctuations, their consumption presents less idiosyncratic fluctuations. This
is consistent with the theoretical prediction that countries prefer consumption to be
smoother. It is also consistent with empirical findings of some level of inter-temporal
smoothing in international Macroeconomics.
Each of the 820 β̂Cij has its own confidence interval. Table 2.5 shows summary
statistics on the upper and lower bounds of those estimates. The median lower bound
is .104, meaning the half of the consumption risk sharing estimates are above 10.4%
with 95% of confidence.
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Table 2.6 shows the estimates of consumption risk sharing averaged for each coun-
try. Indonesia shares the most risk, which can be interpreted as a low level of id-
iosyncratic consumption growth fluctuations through borrowing and lending given a
relatively high level of idiosyncratic income growth fluctuations. Argentina shares the
least.
The pair of countries that presents the most consumption risk sharing is Colombia-
Egypt. This implies a low level of idiosyncratic consumption fluctuations given rela-
tively high levels of idiosyncratic income fluctuations. Argentina and Denmark share
the least.
Pairing with the U.S., Egypt has the highest level of consumption risk sharing
whereas Turkey has the lowest.
2.5.3 Direct Determinants of Income Risk Sharing
The interpretation of the determinants of income risk sharing can be tricky because
they might be correlated with output, but not with the channels through which
output can be smoothed, i.e., with the components of primary income from abroad.
Hence to give a better understanding of how the determinants work, I report the
regressions with output correlation as the dependent variable regressed on the same
set of determinants of risk sharing. This is presented in Table 2.9.
The first two columns do not have country-fixed effects. FDI is negatively cor-
related with income risk sharing. This result is the opposite of what was expected.
This means that FDI is contributing to decrease income smoothing. Instead of using
FDI to invest in places with different output cycles, countries seem to be using it to
invest in places where output fluctuations are correlated, which makes their income
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from direct investments higher in good states and lower in bad states of nature.
Portfolio equity is more consistent with the theoretic prediction. Countries seem to
be investing in places where output fluctuations are negatively associated, such that
they achieve insurance when output fluctuates, making income smoother through
portfolio equity income. In this setting, migration is insignificant to income risk
sharing with or without country-level fixed effects.
The introduction of country-level fixed effects makes the interpretation a bit dif-
ferent. Instead of capturing the overall effect of the bilateral relation, in the presence
of country-level fixed effects, the coefficients are only going to capture what is beyond
the characteristics of each country independently of the pair. This can be interpreted
as some sort of synergy within the pairs of counties such that it is not just the linear
sum of their individual characteristics, it is a feature of the pair of countries that
makes the potential determinants significant to risk sharing. For income risk sharing
all the coefficients become insignificant in the presence of country-level fixed effects.
2.5.4 Direct Determinants of Consumption Risk Sharing
Table 2.10 presents the direct determinants of consumption risk sharing. Those deter-
minants are focused on means of international borrowing and lending. BIS deposits
are the only channel that is positive and significant to consumption risk sharing, with
or without country-level fixed effects. This is consistent with the theoretical predic-
tion that countries should use their international deposits to smooth consumption in
bad states of income growth.
BIS loans, IMF loans, reserves and SDR seem to have the opposite effect. The
pattern is about the same with or without fixed effects. Instead of helping countries
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to smooth consumption, these instruments are increasing consumption risk, such that
apparently in good states of nature these instruments are plenty and in bad states
theses instruments are more scarce to countries. BIS and IMF loans, reserves and
SDR’s seem to be working pro-cyclically with respect to consumption growth.
2.5.5 Indirect Determinants of Income Risk Sharing
Table 2.11 shows that WTO membership is positively associated with income risk
sharing. Examining the direct determinants of income risk sharing, there are some
potential explanations. One possibility is that WTO membership is positively asso-
ciated with trade, and trade is negatively associated with foreign direct investment,
assuming that its negative sign in Table 2.9 is correct. Another possibility is that
WTO membership is positively associated with trade, and trade is positively asso-
ciated with portfolio equity investments (debt or equity securities, other than those
included in direct investment or reserve assets).
The coefficients for sharing an official language, having strong migration flows and
having a large fraction of firms listed in the stock market are significantly positive.
These factors should improve information for the pairs of countries, reducing trans-
action costs and contributing to international flows of primary income that make
idiosyncratic fluctuations of income smoother than output. The coefficients remain
significantly positive in the presence of fixed effects, which points to some sort of
synergy in having a pair of countries with a high value of those variables.
The product of output of the pair of countries is a common term in gravity models
of trade, but the findings of this paper do not indicate any significant relation for
income risk sharing. One possible reason relies on a potential ambiguity. On the
one hand, trading securities with larger and closer economies may present gains of
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scale and reduced transaction costs. On the other hand, larger and closer economies
have a higher correlation of output fluctuations, making the partner country a less
interesting source of income insurance.
Legal rights index is significant but with a negative sign, which makes it difficult to
reconcile with the prediction that enforcement of legal rights should improve a coun-
try’s capability of trading securities. All other variables are insignificant, including
GDP differences and regional trade agreements.
2.5.6 Indirect Determinants of Consumption Risk Sharing
The results for the indirect determinants of consumption risk sharing are presented
in Table 2.12. The product of output of the pair of countries is significantly positive.
One possible interpretation might be that the gains of borrowing and lending from
larger and closer economies overcome the disadvantages of borrowing and lending from
economies that present a higher income correlation, thus less potential for insurance.
WTO and other trade agreements memberships also present significant positive
coefficients. This can be interpreted as being part of trade agreements facilitates
access to international borrowing and lending, which helps consumption smoothing.
The positive sign of the coefficient of geographic distance is consistent with the idea
that countries that are farther away are a better source of insurance. Migration, the
ease-of-doing-business index, the legal rights index are also positive, as these factors
seem to lower informational problems and transaction costs.
The coefficients on credit information index and the share of companies listed
in the stock market are significantly negative. The behavior of these coefficients is
rather similar with or without country fixed effects. This is counter intuitive, as these
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factors should also be contributing to lower transaction costs, thus easier access to
international borrowing and lending.
2.6 Conclusion
Economic theory predicts that countries will trade securities to insure themselves
against idiosyncratic output shocks in order to smooth income and consumption
growth. However, several empirical papers have found very low levels or even zero risk
sharing across countries, creating a puzzle to the macroeconomic literature. Using a
pairwise approach, this paper provides empirical evidence of the determinants that
do help income and consumption risk sharing, and those that do not.
The first step is to estimate levels of risk sharing for each pair of countries. The
median value of income risk sharing is nearly zero, whereas for consumption it is .37.
This implies that countries seem to be smoothing some of the idiosyncratic shocks to
output growth through international borrowing and lending as opposed to primary
income.
Then I use the estimated coefficients on the left-hand side and look for direct
and indirect determinants. Among the direct determinants, holding portfolio equity
assets seems to be an important instrument for income risk sharing, whereas BIS
deposits seem to be important for consumption smoothing. BIS and IMF loans, SDR
and reserves seem to be working pro-cyclically.
Some of the indirect determinants of risk sharing are significant with a positive
sign. Having a common language, strong migration and a large share of companies
listed in the stock market seems to be contributing to income smoothing, whereas
the list of significant determinants of consumption risk sharing includes the product
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of output of the pair of counties, geographic distance, WTO and other regional trade
agreements memberships, legal rights index and the ease-of-doing-business index.
Several candidate determinants of risk sharing were reported significant, specially
regarding consumption risk sharing. Most of them do have the expected sign, being
coherent with theoretical predictions. The pairwise approach seems to be a better
strategy for studying the puzzle of low levels of international risk sharing, and identi-
fying the determinants that do help and the ones that fail to help seems to be a good
starting point for clarifying this macroeconomic puzzle.
This paper aims at the determinants of risk sharing, not its components. Future
research can approach the problem by using the same pairwise strategy to look at
the components of income and consumption that derive from the macroeconomic
identities, e.g., by doing a variance-covariance decomposition with the elements of
the GDP-GNI and the GNI-Consumption relations.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics on the Estimated β̂Iij — income risk sharing
Confidence Interval Obs. Median Mean Min Max
Lower Bound (95% CI) 820 -0.115 -0.134 -0.493 0.457
β̂Iij 820 -0.010 -0.000 -0.249 0.839
Upper Bound (95% CI) 820 0.093 0.133 -0.098 1.220
Notes: β̂Iij is estimated from g˜dpijt − g˜niijt = αIij + βIij g˜dpijt + ijt, where g˜dpijt = ∆ ln gdpit −
∆ ln gdpjt is the output growth differential between the pair of countries i and j. Similarly, g˜niijt
is the national income growth differential for i and j. For each pair of countries there is a β̂Iij with
its own confidence interval. The table shows the summary statistics for the estimate of βIij itself
and its upper and lower bounds over all pairs.
Table 2.2: Average Income Risk Sharing per Country — β̂Ii
Country i β̂Ii Country i β̂
I
i Country i β̂
I
i
Switzerland 0.195 Algeria 0.008 UK -0.024
Egypt 0.092 Germany 0.005 Finland -0.026
Brazil 0.085 Austria 0.003 Colombia -0.027
Peru 0.060 Italy 0.003 Thailand -0.028
Philippines 0.057 USA 0.003 Singapore -0.034
Greece 0.055 China 0.002 Belgium -0.034
Spain 0.032 Portugal -0.001 Turkey -0.047
Netherlands 0.028 France -0.004 Chile -0.054
Malaysia 0.026 Norway -0.005 Korea -0.061
Pakistan 0.024 India -0.006 Venezuela -0.075
SouthAfrica 0.022 Canada -0.008 Indonesia -0.079
Denmark 0.017 Japan -0.009 Sweden -0.092
Iran 0.016 Russia -0.012 Argentina -0.121
Australia 0.013 Mexico -0.017 .
Notes: β̂Iij is defined as in Table 2.1. For each country i, β̂
I
i is the average over all j’s
in β̂Ii,j .
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Table 2.3: Top 10 and Low 10 Income Risk Sharing
Measures
Top 10 Low 10
Country i Country j β̂Iij Country i Country j β̂
I
ij
Austria Switzerland 0.839 Egypt Turkey -0.249
Switzerland Pakistan 0.566 Singapore Sweden -0.222
Australia Switzerland 0.488 Indonesia Singapore -0.219
Switzerland Norway 0.413 Austria Sweden -0.192
Switzerland Egypt 0.392 France Sweden -0.175
Switzerland Peru 0.386 Netherlands Sweden -0.160
Switzerland Denmark 0.386 Italy Sweden -0.149
Switzerland Italy 0.382 Argentina Italy -0.144
Belgium Switzerland 0.366 Indonesia Sweden -0.137
Brazil Egypt 0.353 Argentina Japan -0.133
Notes: β̂Iij is defined as in Table 2.1. The list on the left shows the pairwise relations with
the highest levels of income risk sharing, whereas the list on the right shows those with the
lowest levels of income risk sharing.
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Table 2.4: Top 10 and Low 10 Measures of
Income Risk Sharing with USA
Top 10 Low 10
Country j β̂IUSA,j Country j β̂
I
USA,j
Switzerland 0.253 Sweden -0.167
Philippines 0.171 Indonesia -0.152
Peru 0.108 Argentina -0.142
Pakistan 0.093 Belgium -0.112
Brazil 0.073 Singapore -0.104
Egypt 0.066 Korea -0.061
Greece 0.056 Turkey -0.057
SouthAfrica 0.051 Venezuela -0.052
Malaysia 0.039 Chile -0.031
Australia 0.031 Portugal -0.025
Notes: β̂Iij is defined as in Table 2.1. For the pairwise
relations with USA, the list on the left shows those with
the highest levels of income risk sharing, whereas the list
on the right shows those with the lowest levels of income
risk sharing.
Table 2.5: Summary Statistics on the Estimated β̂Cij — consumption risk sharing
Confidence Interval Obs. Median Mean Min Max
Lower Bound (95% CI) 820 0.104 0.122 -1.058 0.771
β̂Cij 820 0.371 0.394 -0.520 1.243
Upper Bound (95% CI) 820 0.632 0.666 0.017 1.728
Notes: β̂Cij is estimated from g˜niijt − c˜ijt = αCij + βCij g˜niijt +ωijt, where c˜ijt = ∆ ln cit −∆ ln cjt is
the consumption growth differential between the pair of countries i and j. Similarly, g˜niijt is the
national income growth differential for i and j. For each pair of countries there is a β̂Cij with its
own confidence interval. The table shows the summary statistics for the estimate of βCij itself and
its upper and lower bounds over all pairs.
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Figure 2.1: Histograms of the β̂Iij Coefficients and their Bounds
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Table 2.6: Average Consumption Risk Sharing per Country β̂Ci
Country i β̂Ci Country i β̂
C
i Country i β̂
C
i
Indonesia 0.725 France 0.438 Portugal 0.311
Egypt 0.680 Norway 0.430 Spain 0.303
Switzerland 0.635 Australia 0.428 Algeria 0.296
Singapore 0.566 Japan 0.428 Thailand 0.293
Sweden 0.554 Canada 0.420 Venezuela 0.278
Philippines 0.549 Pakistan 0.408 Turkey 0.268
Russia 0.520 Denmark 0.402 Greece 0.237
Colombia 0.496 China 0.396 Malaysia 0.234
Finland 0.494 Iran 0.395 Peru 0.228
Germany 0.483 USA 0.384 Chile 0.215
Austria 0.473 UK 0.360 SouthAfrica 0.194
Belgium 0.471 Italy 0.341 Mexico 0.187
Brazil 0.445 Korea 0.339 Argentina 0.077
Netherlands 0.440 India 0.338 .
Notes: β̂Cij is defined as in Table 2.5. For each country i, β̂
C
i is the average over all
j’s in β̂Ci,j .
Table 2.7: Top 10 and Low 10 Consumption Risk Sharing Measures
Top 10 Low 10
Country i Country j β̂Cij Country i Country j β̂
C
ij
Colombia Egypt 1.243 Russia Turkey -0.520
Algeria Indonesia 1.143 Spain SouthAfrica -0.102
Switzerland Pakistan 1.050 India SouthAfrica -0.068
Switzerland Colombia 1.049 Argentina Malaysia -0.047
Germany Egypt 0.979 Argentina Australia -0.034
Egypt Sweden 0.955 Argentina China -0.001
Australia Egypt 0.954 Argentina Norway 0.012
Indonesia Turkey 0.936 Chile Netherlands 0.031
Switzerland Egypt 0.935 Australia SouthAfrica 0.051
Belgium Egypt 0.930 Argentina Denmark 0.070
Notes: β̂Cij is defined as in Table 2.5. The list on the left shows the pairwise relations with
the highest levels of consumption risk sharing, whereas the list on the right shows those with
the lowest levels of consumption risk sharing.
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Table 2.8: Top 10 and Low 10 Measures of
Consumption Risk Sharing with USA
Top 10 Low 10
Country j β̂CUSA,j Country j β̂
C
USA,j
Egypt 0.854 Argentina 0.013
Singapore 0.744 Peru 0.081
Switzerland 0.742 Mexico 0.105
Indonesia 0.690 SouthAfrica 0.113
Russia 0.619 Spain 0.153
Colombia 0.593 Chile 0.201
Germany 0.561 Malaysia 0.212
Sweden 0.544 Greece 0.226
Belgium 0.501 Italy 0.241
Philippines 0.498 Turkey 0.250
Notes: β̂Cij is defined as in Table 2.5. For the pairwise re-
lations with USA, the list on the left shows those with the
highest levels of consumption risk sharing, whereas the list
on the right shows those with the lowest levels of consump-
tion risk sharing.
Table 2.9: Direct Determinants of Income Risk Sharing
Dependent GDP βˆCij GDP βˆ
C
ij
Variable Correlation Correlation
FDI 37.720 -140.518** 20.293 -52.879
(91.123) (56.247) (134.066) (99.122)
Portfolio Equity -0.964 2.859*** -2.714 1.250
(1.363) (0.753) (1.876) (1.020)
Migration 0.103 0.078 0.219 0.003
(0.087) (0.059) (0.154) (0.113)
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.003 0.036 0.053 0.347
Obs. 780 780 780 780
Notes: GDP Correlation is the correlation of output of countries i and j. β̂Iij is defined as
in Table 2.1. FDI and Portfolio Equity are percentages of GDP. Migrantion is international
migrant stock as a percentage of population. The regressors are averaged over the period of
1978 - 2013.
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Figure 2.2: Histograms of the β̂Cij Coefficients and their Bounds
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Table 2.10: Direct Determinants of Consumption Risk Sharing
Dependent GNI βˆCij GNI βˆ
C
ij
Variable Correlation Correlation
BIS Deposits -0.009 0.241*** 0.045 0.272***
(0.038) (0.044) (0.082) (0.050)
BIS Loans 0.020 -0.161*** -0.007 -0.174***
(0.050) (0.058) (0.093) (0.062)
IMF Loans 0.092 -4.754*** 0.728 -2.436***
(0.611) (0.763) (0.921) (0.914)
Multilateral Loans -0.291 0.515 -0.465* 0.355
(0.227) (0.318) (0.261) (0.292)
Reserves 0.047 -0.138*** -0.013 -0.140***
(0.031) (0.035) (0.052) (0.040)
SDR 2.541 -11.227* 9.447 -7.126
(4.575) (5.857) (8.547) (8.267)
Securities 0.005 -0.014 0.003 -0.000
(0.019) (0.023) (0.029) (0.023)
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.010 0.165 0.082 0.425
Obs. 703 703 703 703
Notes: GNI Correlation is the correlation of national income of countries i and j. β̂Cij is
defined as in Table 2.5. BIS deposits and loans refer to operations with the Bank for
International Settlements reporting banks. All regressors are percentages of GDP averaged
over the period of 1978 - 2013.
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Table 2.11: Indirect Determinants of Income Risk Sharing
Dependent GDP βˆCij GDP βˆ
C
ij
Variable Correlation Correlation
GDPi x GDPj 0.277 -0.003 0.308 -0.150
(0.213) (0.108) (0.258) (0.103)
GDP Difference 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.005) (0.003) (0.006) (0.002)
WTO/GATT -0.022 0.013* -0.013 0.015*
(0.014) (0.007) (0.021) (0.008)
Reg. Trade Agreem. -0.070 -0.023 0.092 0.234
(0.056) (0.034) (0.135) (0.217)
Common Language 0.000 0.054*** 0.014 0.050***
(0.012) (0.007) (0.017) (0.008)
Geographic Distance -0.021 -0.017 0.012 -0.007
(0.030) (0.022) (0.039) (0.027)
Migration 0.142 0.195*** 0.257* 0.117*
(0.099) (0.060) (0.146) (0.068)
Ease-of-Business Index 0.013 0.005 0.005 0.001
(0.013) (0.007) (0.018) (0.009)
Credit Info Index -0.011** 0.003 -0.011 0.007**
(0.005) (0.003) (0.007) (0.003)
Legal Rights Index -0.004 -0.013*** -0.007 -0.011***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.005) (0.003)
Listed Companies 0.006 0.052*** 0.012 0.040***
(0.015) (0.008) (0.022) (0.010)
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.021 0.171 0.066 0.421
Obs. 780 780 780 780
Notes: GDP Correlation is the correlation of output of countries i and j. β̂Iij is defined as in
Table 2.1. GDPi x GDPj and GDP Difference ij are in logs of Dollars. WTO/GATT takes
the value of 2, 1 or 0, if both, one or neither country is a member of the WTO (or used to be of
the GATT). Reg. Trade Agreem. is a dummy variable indicating a regional trade agreement
in force for the pair of countries. Common language is a dummy variable indicating that the
two countries share one official language. Geographic distance is the distance between the
pair of countries weighted by their major cities. Migrantion is international migrant stock as
a percentage of population. Ease-of-Business, Credito Info, Legal Rights Index and Listed
Companies in the stock market are provided by the World Bank Development Indicators
and their appropriate names are listed in the appendices. All the variables are averaged over
the period of 1978 - 2013.
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Table 2.12: Indirect Determinants of Consumption Risk Sharing
Dependent GNI βˆCij GNI βˆ
C
ij
Variable Correlation Correlation
GDPi x GDPj 0.347 1.127*** 0.331 1.551***
(0.215) (0.213) (0.258) (0.205)
GDP Difference -0.005 0.002 -0.003 0.005
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004)
WTO/GATT -0.026* 0.066*** -0.010 0.022
(0.014) (0.015) (0.021) (0.015)
Reg. Trade Agreem. -0.064 0.309*** 0.092 0.658***
(0.052) (0.068) (0.193) (0.204)
Common Language 0.018 -0.004 0.032* -0.004
(0.013) (0.015) (0.018) (0.019)
Geographic Distance 0.011 0.066* 0.055 0.158***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.039) (0.039)
Migration 0.244** 0.334*** 0.497*** 0.334**
(0.107) (0.112) (0.150) (0.134)
Ease-of-Business Index 0.021 0.070*** 0.005 0.102***
(0.013) (0.014) (0.019) (0.015)
Credit Info Index -0.013** -0.081*** -0.007 -0.099***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.006)
Legal Rights Index -0.008** 0.008* -0.010* 0.011*
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Listed Companies 0.017 -0.025 0.009 -0.036*
(0.015) (0.017) (0.024) (0.021)
Country F.E. No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.028 0.329 0.086 0.587
Obs. 780 780 780 780
Notes: GNI Correlation is the correlation of national income of countries i and j. β̂Cij
is defined as in Table 2.5. GDPi x GDPj and GDP Difference ij are in logs of Dollars.
WTO/GATT takes the value of 2, 1 or 0, if both, one or neither country is a member of the
WTO (or used to be of the GATT). Reg. Trade Agreem. is a dummy variable indicating a
regional trade agreement in force for the pair of countries. Common language is a dummy
variable indicating that the two countries share one official language. Geographic distance
is the distance between the pair of countries weighted by their major cities. Migrantion is
international migrant stock as a percentage of population. Ease-of-Business, Credito Info,
Legal Rights Index and Listed Companies in the stock market are provided by the World
Bank Development Indicators and their appropriate names are listed in the appendices. All
the variables are averaged over the period of 1978 - 2013.
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.1 List of Countries
1. Argentine Republic
2. Commonwealth of Australia
3. Federative Republic of Brazil
4. People’s Republic of China
5. French Republic
6. Federal Republic of Germany
7. Republic of India
8. Republic of Indonesia
9. Italian Republic
10. Japan
11. Republic of Korea
12. United Mexican States
13. Kingdom of the Netherlands
14. Russian Federation
15. Kingdom of Spain
16. Switzerland
17. Republic of Turkey
18. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
84
19. United States of America
20. People’s Democratic Republic of Algeria
21. Republic of Austria
22. Kingdom of Belgium
23. Canada
24. Republic of Chile
25. Republic of Colombia
26. Kingdom of Denmark
27. Arab Republic of Egypt
28. Republic of Finland
29. Hellenic Republic
30. Islamic Republic of Iran
31. Malaysia
32. Kingdom of Norway
33. Republic of Peru
34. Islamic Republic of Pakistan
35. Republic of the Philippines
36. Portuguese Republic
37. Republic of Singapore
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38. Republic of South Africa
39. Kingdom of Sweden
40. Kingdom of Thailand
41. Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela
.2 World Bank Development Indicators Variables
1. GDP growth (annual %). Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market
prices based on constant local currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005
U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included
in the value of the products. It is calculated without making deductions for
depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural
resources.
2. GNI growth (annual %). GNI (formerly GNP) is the sum of value added by
all resident producers plus any product taxes (less subsidies) not included in
the valuation of output plus net receipts of primary income (compensation of
employees and property income) from abroad.
3. Final consumption expenditure, etc. (annual % growth). Average annual
growth of final consumption expenditure based on constant local currency. Ag-
gregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. Final consumption expendi-
ture (formerly total consumption) is the sum of household final consumption
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expenditure (formerly private consumption) and general government final con-
sumption expenditure (formerly general government consumption). This esti-
mate includes any statistical discrepancy in the use of resources relative to the
supply of resources.
4. Foreign direct investment, net inflows + net outflows (% of GDP). Net inflows
plus net outflows of investment to acquire a lasting management interest (10
percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating in an economy
other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment
of earnings, other long-term capital, and short-term capital as shown in the
balance of payments.
5. Portfolio equity, net inflows (BoP, current US$) Portfolio equity includes net
inflows from equity securities other than those recorded as direct investment and
including shares, stocks, depository receipts (American or global), and direct
purchases of shares in local stock markets by foreign investors.
6. International migrant stock (% of population) International migrant stock is the
number of people born in a country other than that in which they live. It also
includes refugees. The data used to estimate the international migrant stock at
a particular time are obtained mainly from population censuses.
7. Strength of legal rights index (0=weak to 12=strong). Strength of legal rights
index measures the degree to which collateral and bankruptcy laws protect the
rights of borrowers and lenders and thus facilitate lending. The index ranges
from 0 to 12, with higher scores indicating that these laws are better designed
to expand access to credit.
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8. Ease of doing business index (-1=most to -189=least business-friendly regula-
tions). Ease of doing business ranks economies from 1 to 189, with first place
being the best. A high ranking (a low numerical rank) means that the regula-
tory environment is conducive to business operation. The index averages the
country’s percentile rankings on 10 topics covered in the World Bank’s Doing
Business. The ranking on each topic is the simple average of the percentile
rankings on its component indicators.
9. Depth of credit information index (0=low to 8=high). Depth of credit infor-
mation index measures rules affecting the scope, accessibility, and quality of
credit information available through public or private credit registries. The in-
dex ranges from 0 to 8, with higher values indicating the availability of more
credit information, from either a public registry or a private bureau, to facilitate
lending decisions.
10. Market capitalization of listed companies (% of GDP). Market capitalization
(also known as market value) is the share price times the number of shares out-
standing. Listed domestic companies are the domestically incorporated com-
panies listed on the country’s stock exchanges at the end of the year. Listed
companies does not include investment companies, mutual funds, or other col-
lective investment vehicles.
.3 Joint External Debt Hub Variables
1. Cross-border deposits with BIS reporting banks. The data are derived from the
BIS locational banking statistics. Deposits with BIS reporting banks are shown
in BIS publications as banks’ liabilities to their creditors.
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2. Cross-border loans from BIS reporting banks. The data are derived from the
Bank for International Settlements (BIS) Locational Banking Statistics. The
key organizational criteria are the country of residence of the reporting banks
and their counterparties. All positions are recorded on a gross basis, including
those vis-a-vis own affiliates.
3. Multilateral loans, IMF. The data cover total outstanding loans and other lia-
bilities to the IMF as at the end of the reference period.
4. Multilateral loans, other institutions. The data are sourced from the African De-
velopment Bank, Asian Development Bank, and Inter-American Development,
and IBRD loans and IDA credits from the World Bank.
5. International reserves (excluding gold). The data on international reserve assets
refer to entries published in the world tables of the IMFs International Financial
Statistics (IFS). International reserve assets as defined in BPM6, consist of
those external assets that are readily available to and controlled by monetary
authorities for meeting balance of payments financing needs, for intervention in
exchange markets to affect the currency exchange rate, and for other related
purposes (such as maintaining confidence in the currency and the economy, and
serving as a basis for foreign borrowing).
6. SDR allocation. SDRs are international reserve assets created by the IMF and
allocated to members to supplement existing official reserves. Holdings of SDRs
by an IMF member are recorded as an asset, while the allocation of SDRs is
recorded as the incurrence of a liability of the member receiving them
7. International debt securities, all maturities. The data are derived from quar-
terly BIS statistics on issues of money market instruments, bonds and notes in
89
international markets and are based on information provided by various mar-
ket sources (such as Euroclear, Dealogic, Thomson Financial Securities Data
and ISMA). International debt securities cover all foreign currency issues by
residents and non-residents in a given market, including in the borrowers own
currency, and foreign bonds (domestic currency bonds issued by non-residents
in a given market).
.4 Head et al. (2010) Dataset Variables
1. Geographic distance. Bilateral distances based on population-weighted great
circle distance between large cities of the two countries.
2. WTO/GATT membership comes from the WTO web site.
3. Regional Trade Agreement membership. Dummy variable indicating a WTO
reported Regional Trade Agreements in force between the two countries of the
pair.
4. Common language. Common official language data come from the CEPII dis-
tance database (http://www.cepii.fr/anglaisgraph/bdd/distances.htm).
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